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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The sale of arms has become increasingly important as a 
result of volatile factions scattered throughout the world. 
Today, exchange of arms has become big business and 
consequently a crucial dimension of international affairs. 
Arms sales are said to be indirect means of ensuring a 
nation's defense, making it possible for recipient nations to 
defend their security. They are also instruments of diplo- 
macy, used either to develop closer relations between trading 
countries or to avoid their deterioration and buy influence, 
which is banked for use at critical times when the supplier 
nation needs the support of foreign nations.  [Ref. l:p. 112] 
The continuing scientific and technological innovations 
in our era made it possible to produce more destructive, more 
accurate and more numerous weapons systems each year. 
However, especially for developing countries, it's extremely 
difficult to produce a variety of advanced arms, based on high 
technology. Often, these countries don't have sufficient 
internal economic resources for the establishment of an 
advanced domestic arms industry. But, they still require 
technologically advanced weapon systems for self defense 
purposes. In that light, while there are numerous agreements 
to decrease nuclear arms stockpiles between the super powers, 
conventional arms transfers continue to play an increasingly 
important part in promoting international and regional 
stability while  enhancing the  security of  allies.  Thus, 
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countries will continue to purchase required military weaponry 
from international sources.  [Ref. 2:p. 2] 
Beginning with World War II, the United States became one 
of the major arms suppliers for its allies and friendly 
countries. First, the U.S. provided arms on a "grant aid" 
basis. Later, when the recipient countries made significant 
economic progress, "sales" replaced grant aid. Subsequent to 
the end of the Cold War and the formal dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R., Russia's arms agreements lessened, while the U.S. 
remained the undisputed leader in arms sales to the world. 
Today, the U.S. approximately accounts for 3 8% of world arms 
exports. While the U.S. is the most prolific exporter of 
arms, arms production outside the U.S. , especially in Western 
Europe and developing countries is increasing both in scope 
and sophistication. Also, the expansion of arms production in 
the developing countries since the end of the World War II has 
been quite extensive. 
Currently, the transfer of military weaponry from the 
U.S. to other countries is done in three basic ways: grants, 
loans, and sales (military or commercial). To implement these 
transfers through the sales program, the U.S. developed the 
concept of "Security Assistance." Security Assistance is an 
"umbrella" term for a group of programs in which the U.S. 
provides defense articles, military training, and other 
defense related services by grant, credit or cash sales. 
B.   THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The objectives of this thesis are to describe and analyze 
the Foreign Military Sales/Lease  (FMS/FML)  ship transfer 
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process for the turnover of U.S. Navy ships to allied nations 
under provisions of the Security Assistance program and to 
improve the effectiveness of the Turkish Navy in procuring 
U.S. Navy ships through FMS/FML. The FMS ship transfer 
process will be analyzed using the "Hot Ship" transfer case 
example of the sale/lease of nine former U.S. Knox Class 
Frigates to Turkey during 1993-1994. The research and analysis 
involved in this thesis will contribute to the knowledge 
needed by foreign officers who will work in conjunction with 
U.S. officials engaged in the transfers of U.S. Navy ships in 
the future. 
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary 
What are the problematic issues involved with the FMS/FML 
of nine former U.S. Knox Class Frigates to Turkey, by using 
the "Hot Ship" transfer method and how can these issues be 
resolved? 
2. Subsidiary 
a. What is the Security Assistance Program and 
what are the procurement possibilities within this program 
that are available to foreign countries? 
b. What are the current FMS/FML ship transfer 
methods and procedures for the turnover of former U.S. Navy- 
vessels to allied countries under the provisions of the 
Security Assistance programs? 
c. What are the major features associated with the 
"Hot Ship" transfer of U.S. Naval vessels to allied countries? 
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d. What are the lessons learned from the FMS/FML ship 
transfer case of the Knox Class Frigates for Turkey? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF RESEARCH 
The scope of this thesis is limited to an analysis of the 
United States Foreign Military Sale/Lease policy and proce- 
dures for the transfer of naval vessels to allied nations; the 
U.S. Navy agencies concerned with the transfer process. The 
analysis is formed on identified problems associated with the 
FMS/FML "Hot Ship" transfer process with respect to the 
Turkish procurement of the Knox Class Frigates during 
1993/1994. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
A literature search of all documentation associated with 
the FMS/FML of the nine Knox Class Ships to Turkey was 
conducted including FMS/FML statutes, U.S. Navy policies, 
regulations and Congressional Subcommittee Reports. Informa- 
tion was also obtained from the Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management (DISAM); the Defense Technological 
Information Center (DTIC); Defense Logistics Studies Informa- 
tion Exchange (DLSIE); the Office of the U.S. Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO); and the Naval Headquarters (HQ)/Department 
of Defense (DoD) equivalent in Turkey. 
Interviews were conducted with personnel from the 
following agencies: 
• The U.S. Navy International Policy Office (Navy 
IPO) . 
• The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). 
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• Program Managers from CINCs that are responsible 
for the transfer of ships. 
• The Turkish Naval Headquarters. 
• The military attache of Turkey in the U.S. 
After a detailed review of current FMS/FML "Hot Ship" 
transfer policy and procedures, the FMS/FML transfer of the 
nine former U.S. Knox Class Frigates to Turkey was analyzed 
and related problems were identified. As a result of this 
analysis, potential solutions are proposed to effectively 
implement future Security Assistance programs between the U.S. 
and Turkey. 
F.   ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I will discuss the background and the objectives 
of the thesis. 
Chapter II introduces the concept of Security Assistance 
and explains the history of the U.S. system for arms sales 
approval. Included in the discussion of Security Assistance 
is a dissection of the procurement possibilities inherent in 
this form of military aid that are available to foreign 
countries. 
Chapter III discusses the policies and procedures for 
FMS/FML of U.S. Navy ships to foreign governments. Included 
in this chapter is a thorough discussion of ship transfer 
methods and specifically delineates the differences between 
"Hot Ship" and "Cold Ship" transfers. 
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the Knox Class ship 
procurement for Turkey.  Analyzed within this chapter are all 
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aspects of the sale/lease procedures followed by Turkey to 
obtain nine former U.S. Knox Class Frigates. Problematic 
issues concerning the ship transfer program were discussed as 
well as lessons learned from the transfer process. 
Chapter V presents conclusions and specific issues 
identified in this study along with answers to the thesis 
questions. 
Chapter VI presents recommendations regarding the 
effective implementation of future FMS/FML ship transfer 
programs. 
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II.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND THE U.S. 
SYSTEM FOR ARMS SALES APPROVAL 
A.   HISTORY 
1.   The Place of the U.S. in World Arms Sales 
The transfer of weaponry has remained a vital part of 
global relations throughout man's warfighting history. 
Historically, mankind has sought to gain the advantage over 
his/her opponent through militaristic dominance. In this 
struggle for superiority, weaponry transfer has continued to 
play an integral role in all political relationships between 
trading nations. Although the desire to procure weaponry has 
continued, the mechanisms for transfer has changed depending 
on the political climate, and technology advancement. 
Beginning with WWI, the United States became the 
industrial arsenal and major arms suppliers for its allies and 
friendly countries. Before 1935, the total annual expendi- 
tures for world military system requirements were 
approximately $4.5 billion. In today's prices, using the 1991 
constant dollars index, these expenditures might represent 
$40-50 billion dollars. As of 1991, approximate total world 
military expenditures were $1,038 billion. This dramatic 
increase was due to Third World inventory modernization and 
expansion, largely financed by profits from export income, 
particularly oil. Parallel to this upward trend in world arms 
expenditures, developed countries like the U.S. increased 
their arms exports. As of 1991, the United States accounted 
for 37.7% of all world arms exports.  [Ref. 3:p. 12] 
Although the U.S. has continued to be the foremost arms 
exporter to the world, its arms exports have fluctuated from 
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Figure 1.  U.S. Share of World Arms Exports, 1981-1991 
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2.   U.S.- Turkey Arms Sales 
With the advent of the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the 
United States began a policy of constraining Russian 
expansionism. This doctrine led to a defensive policy between 
Turkey and the United States and ensured the eventual 
inclusion of Turkey into NATO. Since Turkey bordered Russia, 
the United States had an ally that could protect the 
Southeastern flank of NATO. 
Subsequent to the implementation of the agreements 
between Turkey and the United States, Turkey began to receive 
various forms of aid. In July 1947, Turkey received $122.5 
million of economic aid and $152.5 million in military 
assistance from the United States. This military assistance 
was used to enhance the posture of Turkey's Army, Navy and Air 
Force and to improve other military facilities. Subsequent 
agreements included the Military Facilities Agreement of June 
1954 and the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 
March 1980.  [Ref. 4:p. 9] 
From 1946 to 1992, Turkey received more than $11 billion 
in the form of grants, credits, cash sales and other forms of 
military assistance [Ref. 5:p. 174] . For 1993-1994, Turkey 
ranked third in a list of countries to accept aid from the 
United States by receiving $450 million dollars. [Ref. 6:p. 
9] 
In 1964, the resilience of the defensive relationship 
between Turkey and the United States was tested by the events 
surrounding the Cyprus conflict. Armed skirmishes in Cyprus 
led to diplomatic attempts at resolving the conflict. After 
several failed attempts in 1964, Turkey contemplated military 
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intervention in June 1964. The United States forestalled this 
intervention by issuing what was commonly referred to as the 
"Johnson Letter." In this letter, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
heatedly warned that the U.S. would refrain from honoring its 
commitment to defend Turkey if the Soviet Union carried out 
its threat to attack the NATO ally in response to Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus. 
The dilemma posed by Cyprus and Greece, which had plagued 
Turkey's U.S. defense relations since 1964, reached a new 
climax in the summer of 1974. A Turkish military intervention 
in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 led to an arms embargo imposed by 
the United States under Congressional pressure on the grounds 
that Turkish utilization of U.S. weaponry violated the U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales 
Act. This embargo took the form of withholding crucial spare 
parts and other necessary logistical apparatus. Thus, the 
United States embargo significantly affected the logistical 
base of the Turkish military and emphasized Turkey's reliance 
on American military support. The effects of the Cyprus 
conflict, the arms embargo and the Greek-Turkish hostility 
brought American-Turkish relations almost to a breaking point 
until a new defense agreement was signed on 30 March 1980. 
Between 1990 and 1992, Turkey's importance to the United 
States reasserted itself as a consequence of the Gulf War. 
The United States recognized the importance of Turkey as it 
spearheaded combat operations directed against the Iraqi 
threat. Beginning in August 1990 and lasting until December 
1991, Turkey gave its full support for Operation Proven Force- 
the air combat operations conducted from Turkey as an adjunct 
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of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm - and for Operation 
Provide Comfort - the coalition effort to provide humanitarian 
relief to more than 500,000 Kurdish refuges who fled from the 
Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein into southeastern Turkey. 
B.   SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
One of the primary methods used to carry out the U.S. 
foreign national security policy has been the transfer of 
defense articles, defense military training and economic 
assistance; or stating it another way, by providing security 
assistance (SA). As it is defined in documents published by 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the term "Security 
Assistance" is defined as follows: 
Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and other 
related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense 
articles, military training, and other defense 
related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash 
sales in the furtherance of national policies and 
objectives.  [Ref. 7:p. 327] 
In general, the U.S. offers security assistance to 
strengthen the national security of friendly nations, and to 
support existing or prospective democratic institutions and 
market economies. Since World War II, it has become a 
institutionalized and continuing program used to advance U.S. 
interests in  a global  environment.  It's not  just a short 
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range  program;  rather,  its  a  continuing  program,  the 
components and magnitude of which change each year due to U.S. 
national interests and foreign policy objectives.  With the 
President's Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) for SA 
programs, fiscal year 1994, these objectives are: 
• Building Democracy through support of free and fair 
electives, respect for human rights, the rule of 
law and economic opportunity. 
• Promoting and maintaining peace by supporting 
peacekeeping efforts, assisting friendly and allied 
nations, insisting upon verifiable arms control and 
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and fostering sustained peaceful development. 
• Promoting economic growth and sustainable develop- 
ment by fostering free and open market, trade 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and 
market based structural reform. 
• Addressing global problems of environmental 
deregulation, narcotics trafficking, terrorism and 
the other criminal activities by increasing 
cooperation with allies, friends, and traditional 
adversaries. 
• Meeting urgent humanitarian needs by supporting 
private and governmental efforts, and by promoting 
economic reform and resolution of local conflicts 
[Ref. 8:p. 5]. 
The Security Assistance program is an important tool for 
the U.S. Government (USG) to accomplish these objectives. 
C.   U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
According to the Congressional Presentation Document for 
Security Assistance programs, there are five key program 
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components which require USG funding.  If we add the FMS/FML 
and Foreign Military Construction Sales Program, plus DCS 
licensed under the Arms Export Control Act(AECA), we arrive at 
total of seven programs.   All procurement of military 
equipment from the USG to other nations falls within the realm 
of one of the seven SA programs [Ref. 8:p. 36].  A brief 
examination of each follows: 
1.   FMS/FML and Foreign Military Construction Sales 
Program 
Normally, the U.S.Government makes defense articles 
available to foreign government by FMS under AECA. However, 
there may be exceptional instances in which a lease agreement 
would be the most appropriate method whereby U.S. defense 
articles can be make available to eligible foreign countries 
or international organizations. Such agreements are author- 
ized under the AECA, Chapter 6 when it is determined that 
there are compelling foreign policy and national security 
reasons for providing such articles on a lease rather than for 
sale.  [Ref. 9:p. 1200-1] 
With these distinctions, FMS/FML is a nonappropriated 
program thorough which eligible foreign governments purchase 
defense articles, services and training from the USG. The 
purchasing government pays all costs that may be associated 
with a sale or lease. In essence, there is a signed 
government-to-government agreement (normally documented on a 
Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for sales or a lease 
agreement for leases) between the USG and a foreign 
government. The lease will not be provided on an LOA, but the 
LOA will be used for packing, crating, handling, 
transportation,  and the sale of associated articles and 
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services, including refurbishment of the defense articles 
required prior to, during, or after the lease period. The LOA 
will also be used to recover applicable costs if the article 
is lost or destroyed during the lease period. Each LOA is 
commonly referred to as a "case" and is assigned a unique case 
identifier for accounting purposes. 
2. The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP or FMF) 
This program has undergone.a variety of substantive and 
terminological changes in recent years. At present, the 
program consists of Congressionally appropriated grants and 
loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase 
U.S. defense articles, services and training. As a grant and 
low interest loan program, FMFP is distinguished from FMS/FML, 
the system through which government-to-government sales of 
military equipment occur. In general, FMFP provides financing 
for FMS/FML. Selected countries, however, have been eligible 
to use FMFP credits for procurement through direct commercial 
contracts with U.S. firms outside of FMS channels. 
Additionally, in FY 1990, the former Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) , was formally merged with the FMFP as Congress 
adopted a Reagan Administration proposal for integrating all 
MAP grant funding into the appropriations account for the FMF 
Program. For FY 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed a 
total of $4,087 billion FMF funding, composed of $3,232 
billion in grants and $855 million in concessional loans. The 
same proposal includes $450 million in concessional loans for 
Turkey. 
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3. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Licensed Under the 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
A direct commercial sale licensed under the AECA is a 
sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. 
Unlike the procedures employed for FMS/FML, direct commercial 
sales transactions are not administered by DOD and do not 
involve a government-to-government agreement.  Rather, the 
U.S. governmental "control" procedure is accomplished through 
licensing by the Office of Defense Trade Control in the 
Department of State. 
4. The International Military Education and Training 
Program (IMET) 
This program provides military education and training in 
the United States and, in some cases, in overseas U.S. 
military facilities to selected foreign military and related 
civilian personnel on a grant basis. Since 1950, IMET and its 
predecessor programs have trained more than 500,000 foreign 
officers and enlisted personnel in areas ranging from 
professional military education to basic technical and nation 
building skills. 
In FY 1989, Congress established a prohibition on the use 
of IMET funds by any country whose annual per capita gross 
national product (GNP) exceeds $2,349.00 unless that country 
agrees to fund from its own resources the transportation costs 
and living allowances (TLA) of its students. Thus IMET funds 
have been restricted to financing tuition costs for these 
countries. For FY 1994, the Administration allocated $2.8 
million for Turkey out of the total proposed program of $42.5 
million. 
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5. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) 
This fund was established to promote economic and 
political stability in areas where the U.S. has special 
political and security interests and where the U.S. has 
determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping 
to secure peace to avert major economic or political crises. 
ESF is a flexible economic instrument which is made available 
on a loan or grant basis for a variety of economic purposes, 
including balance of payment support, infrastructure, and 
other capital and technical assistance development projects. 
The ESF program is administered by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) under the overall policy 
direction of the Secretary of State. The Administration's FY 
1994 request for $2.53 billion reflects a firm U.S. commitment 
to assist other countries to achieve economic growth and 
development. 
6. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, Part II, 
Chapter 6, as amended, authorizes assistance to friendly 
countries and international organizations for peacekeeping 
operations (PKO). Historically, funding under this statute 
has for the most part been limited to support of the U.N. 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Multinational Force and 
Observers in the Sinai (MFO). With the changing international 
security environment, the number of situations requiring 
peacekeeping operations has risen in the early 1990's. 
Consequently, the amount of this fund can be expected to 
increase further in the years ahead. 
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For FY 1994, the Administration proposed a total of 
$77,166 million for PKO.   This amount funded both long- 
standing operations in Cyprus and the Sinai and necessary new 
initiatives in the former Soviet Union, Haiti and Africa. 
7.   The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
This program is a new element in the security assistance 
budget.  In the last years, the nonproliferation and disarma- 
ment of the four nuclear former Soviet Union states (Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has moved to the forefront of 
the U.S. national security agenda.  To help meet these needs, 
for FY 1994 the Administration proposed $50 million for a 
four-part  nonproliferation  and  disarmament  program  of 
Education and Training, Destruction and Conversion, Enforce- 
ment and Interdiction, and Safeguards and Verification. 
D.   U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
The U.S. Security Assistance program has its roots in the 
U.S. public laws which contain security assistance 
authorizations, appropriations, restrictions and reporting 
requirements. To understand how this legislation is welded 
into a coherent, operational foreign policy program, it is 
appropriate to briefly discuss the roles of the three branches 
of the U.S. Federal Government with respect to security 
assistance. 
1.   Executive Branch: The President 
The Constitution of the U.S. establishes the President as 
the nation's chief executive and, by inference, the chief 
arbiter in matters of foreign policy. Furthermore, the same 
constitution empowers the President, by and with the consent 
of the Senate to make treaties and appoint ambassadors and 
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other public ministers. The president is also authorized to 
receive ambassadors and other public ministers - all essential 
facets of carrying out U.S. foreign policy. Finally, it is 
the President who presents the recommended annual U.S. 
assistance program and budget to the Congress for its 
consideration and executes this program once it becomes law. 
As the chief executive, the President is responsible for 
all of the activities of the Executive Branch. While carrying 
out all these activities, the President has numerous assis- 
tants, cabinet officers, and other subordinate officials to 
oversee the conduct of the U.S. Security Assistance program. 
Figure 2 depicts the U.S. Government organization for Security 
Assistance [Ref 8:p. 76]. 
2.   Legislative Branch:  The Congress 
The Congress of the U.S., as provided by the U.S. 
Constitution, is vested with all legislative powers. In terms 
of security assistance, congressional power and influence are 
exerted in several ways: 
• Development, consideration, and action on legisla- 
tion to establish or amend basic security assis- 
tance authorization acts. 
• Enactment of appropriations acts. 
• Passage of Joint Continuing Resolutions to permit 
the incurrence of obligations to carry on essential 
security assistance program activities until 
appropriation action is complete. 
• Conduct of hearings and investigations into special 
areas of interest, to include instructions to the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), and Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) to accomplish special reviews. 
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Ratification of treaties which may have security 
assistance implications.  [Ref. 8:p. 75-77] 
With regard to conventional arms transfers or sales, 
which constitute a major dimension of the U.S. security 
assistance framework, the ultimate authority for such sales 
resides in the U.S. Constitution, which assigns Congress the 
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Through the 
Arms Export Control Act, the Congress has delegated authority 
to the President to administer the arms transfer program 
subject to statutorily prescribed standards and conditions. 
The work of preparing and receiving legislation is 
performed largely by committees (and their staffs) of both 
Houses of Congress. The primary committees of Congress with 
security assistance legislation responsibility are: 
a. Authorizations 
House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (with various Subcommittees); and, Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations (with various Subcommittees). 
b. Appropriations 
House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria- 
tions (Subcommittee on Foreign Operations); and, Senate 
Committee on Appropriations (Subcommittee on Foreign Opera- 
tions) . 
c. Special  Topics 
At times, interest will also be expressed by other 
committees on special topics, e.g., Armed Services Committees; 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committees, etc. 
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3.   Judicial Branch:  The Courts 
According to the Constitution of the U.S., Federal courts 
are responsible for interpreting federal laws and determining 
the constitutionality of U.S. law. Normally, the courts have 
had limited involvement in the day-to-day activities of 
security assistance. However, in holding all statutory 
"legislative veto" provisions unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court of the U.S. invalidated .several clauses of the Arms 
Export Control Act which permitted a "legislative veto" of 
certain security assistance transfers. [Immigration and 
Naturalization Service vs. Chadha (1983)] These clauses were 
amended in 1986. Judicial involvement is also possible should 
a contractor, who is providing materials or services under a 
DOD contract associated with FMS, decide to pursue legal 
remedy in the event of a dispute through an appropriate 
federal court. 
E.   CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS 
Funding for certain security assistance programs must be 
authorized and appropriated. Five such programs include: the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET); the 
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP); the Economic 
Support Fund (ESF); Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and the 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) . Foreign military- 
cash sales/leases and commercial exports are also addressed in 
security assistance legislation - not from a funding stand- 
point, since U.S. appropriated dollars are not involved, but 
from a reporting, control and oversight perspective. 
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1.   Authorization Acts 
With respect to the current U.S. SA program, two basic 
laws are involved. They are: (1) the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA) of 1961 as amended, and (2) the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) as amended. Both the FAA and AECA follow a succession 
of earlier predecessor acts which served as the basis for many 
of the provisions in the FAA and the AECA. 
a. The Foreign Assistance Act   (FAA) 
This act, originally enacted on 4 September 1961, 
contains many provisions which were formerly in the Mutual 
Security Act of 1954. Today, the FAA is the authorizing 
legislation for IMET, ESF, PKO, overseas assistance program 
management, transfer of excess defense articles (EDA), and a 
wide variety of other foreign assistance programs. 
b. The Arms Export  Control Act   (AECA) 
This act came into being under a different title, 
i.e., the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (FMSA). Before 
1968, the basic authority for foreign military sales was the 
FAA. The FMSA served to incorporate the Foreign Military 
Sales Program under a new and separate act. The International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
changed the title of the FMSA to the AECA. The AECA is the 
statutory basis for the conduct of FMS/FML funding for FMFP 
and the control of commercial sales of defense articles and 
services. 
The FAA and the AECA may be amended by annual or 
biennial security assistance authorization acts. Figure 3 
addresses the various acts discussed above in the context of 
their relationship to one another [Ref. 8:p. 50]. 
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2.  Appropriation Acts 
Security Assistance appropriations are included in the 
annual "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act" for each year. As its title 
suggests, this act is the appropriation authority for several 
programs, including security assistance. 
If a new fiscal year begins before an appropriation act 
has been approved, Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) is 
essential to keep the funded foreign assistance programs from 
coming to a standstill.  CRA is defined as: 
The authority to obligate funds against the FMFP, 
IMET, ESF, or other related security assistance 
appropriation for the new fiscal year under a 
Continuing Resolution (CR) granted by Congress in a 
Joint Resolution making temporary appropriations 
prior to passage of the regular appropriations act, 
or in lieu of such an act. Normally, however, the 
CRA is for a designated period less than a fiscal 
year, and such a CRA does not usually allow funding 
for the start of any new programs.  [Ref. 8:p. 51] 
For example, on 1 October 1992, there was no completed FY 
93 legislation for funding of military assistance and other 
U.S. assistance programs. Consequently, an omnibus CR was 
signed on that date extending foreign assistance programs 
through 5 October 1992. On 6 October 1992, the FY 93 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act, was signed into law. For FY 
1994, the Foreign Appropriations Bill was enacted at the final 
moments of FY 93 (On 30 September 1993) so that prior year 
funds could be reallocated in support of FY94 assistance to 
the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. 
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3.   Conditions of Eligibility 
While the U.S. government offers a variety of security 
assistance programs to its allies and friendly nations, there 
are also some restrictions for those countries which can not 
fulfill some requirements for the U.S. security assistance 
program. All these requirements are listed in the FAA and 
AECA. 
F.   NOTIFYING CONGRESS 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 requires the 
President to notify the Congress of certain defense trade 
export applications prior to their approval. Figure 4 
provides a flow chart contrasting the FMS and commercial 
export sale review provisions [Ref. 8:p. 62]. 
1.   Foreign Military Sales/Leases 
The AECA requires the President to submit a numbered 
certification (with justification, impact, etc.) to the 
Congress before issuing a letter of offer to sell or lease 
agreement to lease defense articles or services for $50 
million or more, or any design and construction services for 
$2 00 million or more, or major defense equipment for $14 
million or more. The LOA or lease agreement shall not be 
issued if the Congress, within 3 0 calendar days after 
receiving such certification, adopts a joint resolution 
stating it objects to the proposed sale or lease, unless the 
President states in his certification that an emergency exists 
which requires such sale or lease in the national security 
interest of the U.S. [Ref. 10:Secs. 61-64]. In order to 
provide the Congress with sufficient time to review such 
cases, the  Defense  Security Assistance Agency  (DSAA) has 
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agreed to provide the Congress with 20 days advance notifi- 
cation of such cases prior to the formal submission of the 30 
day statutory notification [Ref. 9:Sec. 703]. 
An exception to the above procedure exists for NATO 
member countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. For 
these "exempted" countries, the formal statutory notification 
period is only 15 days. Furthermore, the 20 days advance 
notification period is not required for these exempt 
countries. 
2 .   Congressional Joint Resolutions 
As indicated above, the AECA contains provisions for the 
congressional rejection of proposals for specific types of FMS 
and direct commercial sales. The mechanism for such 
Congressional action is a joint resolution. 
This is a statement of disapproval of a proposed sale, 
transfer, or lease, which is passed by simple majority votes 
in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Such a 
joint resolution must be sent to the President for review and 
approval. Since the President is unlikely to approve the 
rejection of an action which his Administration originally 
proposed to Congress, the President will likely veto such a 
joint resolution, returning it to Congress. Unless Congress 
is able to override the President's veto by obtaining a two- 
thirds majority vote in each House in support of the original 
resolution of rejection, the sale, transfer, or lease will be 
permitted. However, if Congress can muster sufficient votes 
to override the President's veto, the proposed sale, transfer, 
or lease would not be permitted. 
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G.   SUMMARY 
Through the Security Assistance program, the U.S. has 
remained the undisputed leader in arms sales to the world. 
From 1935 to 1991, total world arms sales have risen from $40 
to $1,038 billion dollars, U.S. accounting for 37.7% of all 
world arms exports. Since 1991, the U.S. has continued this 
trend, with the inclusion of increased arms exports to 
countries such as Turkey. This European nation now ranks 
third in a list of countries to accept aid from one of seven 
components of the Security Assistance program whose primary 
objective is to fulfill U.S. foreign national security 
policies. These seven components of the Security Assistance 
program are: FMS/FML and Foreign Military Construction Sales 
program, the Foreign Military Financing Program, the Direct 
Commercial Sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act 
program, the International Military Education and Training 
program, the Economic Support Fund, Peacekeeping Operations, 
and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. 
All of these components are implemented through author- 
izations, appropriations and policies from the Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial branches of the U.S. Government. 
With respect to the current U.S. Security Assistance program, 
two basic laws are involved: The Foreign Assistance Act is the 
authorizing legislation for IMET, ESF, PKO; while the Arms 
Export Control Act is the statutory basis for the conduct of 
FMS/FML funding for FMFP and the control of commercial sales 
of defense articles and services. Additionally, the arms 
Export Control Act requires the President to notify Congress 
of any defense trade export applications for %50 million or 
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more, design and construction services for $200 million or 
more, and for major defense equipment for $14 million or more. 
Both laws also specify conditions of eligibility for which 
countries must fulfill to qualify for Security Assistance 
program aid. Additionally, Congress also has authority to 
override any Presidential action concerning the Security 
Assistance program through a Congressional Joint Resolution. 
Regardless of these many limitations however, the Security 
Assistance program continues to increase, making the U.S. the 
leader in world arms exports. 
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III. FMS/FML TRANSFER PROCESS OF U.S. NAVAL SHIPS TO 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 
A. SCOPE 
The overall objective of this chapter is to outline and 
describe the policy and process involved in transferring U.S. 
Naval ships to foreign governments through FMS or FML 
procedures. It provides guidance and procedures for the 
transfer of ships which have been or will be, removed from 
service in the U.S. Navy. It does not apply to the sale and 
delivery of Naval ships v to foreign customers through new 
procurement. 
Although every ship transfer will be different, each will 
generally fall within one of the five transfer methods which 
are described later in this chapter. The processes described 
in this chapter contain the tools needed to successfully 
complete such transfers. In the following chapter, the issue 
will be analyzed by a "Hot Ship" transfer example of the 
sale/lease of nine former U.S. Knox Class Frigates to Turkey 
during 1993-1994. 
B. THE U.S. NAVY SHIP TRANSFER PROGRAM 
1.   Background 
The management of all sales, leases, loans and grants of 
U.S. Navy ships fall under the purview of the FMS Security 
Assistance program. Ship transfers support the U.S. foreign 
policy objectives by satisfying defense requirements of allied 
and friendly countries and by strengthening mutual defense 
arrangements with those countries. The transfer of U.S.Navy 
ships significantly improves the capabilities of friendly 
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foreign navies. Additionally, it allows foreign governments 
to make conservative investments (compared to the cost of new 
construction) to acquire and modify U.S. Navy ships for their 
own operations. 
Since both the FMS and FML of ships are managed under the 
same FMS program, policies, responsibilities, and transfer 
methods are similar. The primary difference between selling 
and leasing a ship depends on the status of the ship. 
Although the sale of ships is preferred, leasing of USG ships 
may occur: 
• For  compelling U.S.  foreign  policy  or  national 
security reasons. 
• When ships do not meet FMS criteria. 
• When ships are not needed for public use during the 
period of the lease. 
The primary policy sources for U.S.Navy controlled ship 
transfers via FMS or FML are as follows: 
• DOD 5105.38M (Military Assistance and Sales Manual). 
• SECNAVINST 4900.48 (Transfer of USN Vessels to foreign 
governments and International Organizations). 
• SECNAVINST 4900.45 (Lease of Department of Navy- 
Controlled Defense Articles to Foreign governments and 
International Organizations). 
• DOD 7290.3-M (Foreign Military/Lease Financial Manage- 
ment Manual). 
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Under the provisions of these documents, the following 
are some pertinent policies, responsibilities, and transfer 
methods concerning FMS/FML agreements. Expenses incurred due 
to the implementation of these policies are to be stipulated 
in the FMS/FML contractual agreements. 
2.   U.S. Navy Ship Transfer Policies 
The U.S.Navy policies that govern ship transfers are as 
stated below: 
a.   Cost Allocation 
It is the U.S. Navy policy to transfer ships to 
foreign  customers with minimum cost to the U.S. Government. 
Under this policy, the routine costs of holding and maintain- 
ing a ship prior to transfer of title to the recipient are the 
responsibility of the U.S. Navy and will be funded from direct 
Navy Appropriations.  The cost of any overhaul reactivation, 
modernization,  repair,  or non-routine maintenance  (e.g., 
painting) performed after a foreign customer has officially 
requested transfer of the ships which is performed for their 
benefit is paid by the customer.   A Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance is prepared to recover the costs of any work 
performed for the benefit of the customer and such costs are 
recovered through FMS procedures. Additionally, upon transfer 
of a ship at a foreign location for the convenience of the 
customer, the full costs of delivery to the foreign location 
including personnel, operating, travel and per diem costs of 
returning the crew to their homeport is charged to the 
customer. 
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b. Transfer Ship Conditions 
Ships are transferred with as complete a configura- 
tion as possible. Stripping or otherwise degrading the ships 
that are designated for transfer is not allowed. An exception 
to this occurs where the CNO specifically authorizes a 
transfer with a justification. 
c. Repair Work 
No repair work, modernization, or similar actions 
for the benefit of the foreign country will commence prior to 
notification of and, where applicable, approval of the 
transfer by Congress, the receipt and deposit of foreign 
government funds and issuance of fund authorization documents 
to the performing Naval activities. An exception to this 
occurs where the customer accepts an FMS Case for the work and 
assumes the risk that the transfer may not occur. 
d. "Hot Ship" vs »Cold Ship" Transfers 
If practical, transfers are effected on a "Hot Ship" 
basis, wherein the foreign crew relieves the watch of the 
U.S.Navy crew coincident with the decommissioning of the ship 
from the USN. Hot Ship transfers are mutually beneficial 
since inactivation costs for the U.S. Navy and reactivation 
costs for the recipient navy are minimized. When "Hot Ship" 
transfer is not possible ships status is changed to "Cold 
Ship" and placed in the custody of Inactive Fleet and berthed 
in safe storage awaiting transfer.  [Ref. 11:p. 4] 
e. Training and documentation 
Training and documentation will be sufficient to 
allow the safe and effective operations of the ship and her 
weapon systems.   Tactical publications, operations plans, 
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orders and directives are not transferred with the ship, 
regardless of classification. Additionally, tactics will not 
be taught. If some of the tactical documentation are desired 
by the recipient navy and are authorized for release, they are 
provided separately by the Navy International Policy Office 
(Navy IPO) under an appropriate FMS support case. [Ref. 12] 
f.   Leases 
Leases shall be for a fixed period not to exceed 
five years. Title to leased Department of the Navy- 
controlled vessel shall remain in the U.S. 
Government. On completion or termination of a 
lease and if a lease renewal, ship sale, or other 
permanent transfer is not negotiated, the recipient 
navy is responsible for returning the ship to the 
location specified in the lease. [Ref. 11:p. 3] 
g.   Post Transfer Support 
Coincident with the transfer, the customer Navy may 
purchase follow-on logistics and technical support from the 
USG through FMS procedures or directly from commercial 
sources. 
3.   Responsibilities 
All transfers of USN ships are coordinated with the 
Offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Secretary of 
the Navy (SECNAV) , and the Department of State and are 
authorized only after satisfaction of statutory Congressional 
oversight requirements. The major U.S. Navy organizations 
take part in the ship transfer process are as follows: 
35 
 re iv tran e re i th
re ic io dditi all , ta c il
ta t. som th ta entat e
th e z , he
h o l l ff
(N IP r ri  rt .
s
f.
ll  ixe t
iv r . it e epar ent avy
t l l ll ai . .
over ent. plet er i t  
e  e al, l ,
a ent ra t oti t , t
si l u
o i . ef. : .
. st ransf ort
oi ci t it f r, o er a  a  
r low i t i l ort ro
o r s r i t  o mercial 
r es. 
. esponsibiliti  
  f i s r  r i at  it   
fi s f  ecret r  f efense ) ,  ecret r  f 
 avy AV)    epart ent f t t   r  
t ri  l  ft r t  f  ongre sional 
versi ht i ents. he ajor .S. avy r anizati s 
 art   i  sf r r cess r  s l s: 
5 
a.   The Navy International Policy Office(Navy 
IPO) 
The Navy IPO, under the authority, direction, and 
control of the SECNAV, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition, and Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for International Policy, is responsible 
for ship transfer program planning, implementation, and 
execution. Figure 5-6 depicts the place of the Navy IPO under 
the SECNAV organization. In order to facilitate its responsi- 
bilities the Navy IPO will: 
Act as the USN primary point of contact. 
Develop and disseminate a transfer plan. 
Identify the implementing agent. 
Coordinate transfer preparation decisions. 
Coordinate releasibility determination. 
Coordinate the time and place of the transfer. 
Prepare the LOA or the lease agreement for approval. 
Provide necessary information to the implementing 
agent.  Authorize use of FMS funds. 
b.   The Chief of Naval Operations(CNO) 
The CNO is responsible for disposition of ships, 
identification of ships to be transferred, and obtaining 
appropriate approval to offer ships available to the customer 
Navies. 
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c.   The Implementing Agent 
The Implementing Agent for all "Hot Ship" transfers 
will normally be either the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) or the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific 
Fleet (CINCPACFLT). The Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM) will be the Implementing Agent for the 
transfer of ships which have been inactivated (Cold Ship) and 
are in the custody of the Director, Inactive Fleet. Addition- 
ally, COMNAVSEASYSCOM is normally responsible for follow-on 
technical support management after decommission of the ship. 
In order to facilitate its responsibilities, the implementing 
agent: 
• Prepares the ship for transfer. 
• Hosts the foreign crew. 
• Provides necessary security for the ships prior to 
transfer to the foreign government. 
• Coordinates the foreign crew training. 
• Provides/coordinates  logistic,  communication,  and 
administrative support as authorized. 
• Arranges and conducts the transfer ceremony, acting as 
CNO representative. 
d.   The Navy Education Training Security Assis- 
tance Field Activity (NETSAFA) 
The NETSAFA is the U.S. Navy's executive agent for 
Security Assistance training.  This field activity provides 
formal training in the areas of engineering, weapons, ASW and 
electronics.  Additionally, it provides "on-the-job" training 
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(OJT) in order to improve the watch station qualification of 
the foreign crew for the accomplishment of "safe-to-steam" or 
"combat ready" requirements. 
4.   Ship Transfer Methods 
Five basic methods of FMS/FML ship transfer have 
developed from the common processes experienced over the last 
several decades. Each method reflects the foreign customer's 
general range of service and support requirements. It also 
reflects the funding normally available, and the capabilities 
and limitations of the Implementing Agent assigned to the 
case. For both FMS and FML cases, all service and support 
costs associated with these methods of transfer are normally 
provided through the cost-reimbursement contract of the FMS. 
Each method is considered a general framework from which 
considerable flexibility and adjustment will be needed. The 
following are the are the five transfer methods: 
• "Hot Ship" Transfer Without an Industrial Avail- 
ability. 
• "Hot Ship" Transfer With Follow-On Industrial Avail- 
ability. 
• "Cold Ship" Transfer - "AS IS, WHERE IS." 
• "Cold Ship" Transfer With Minimal Reactivation. 
• "Cold Ship" Transfer With Full Reactivation. 
a.   "Hot Ship" Transfer Without an Industrial 
Availability 
"Hot Ship" transfer refers to the active status of 
the vessel.  Ships that are "hot shipped" have an active duty 
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U.S. Navy crew on them and are operational U.S. Navy vessels. 
Upon U.S. Navy decommissioning, a transfer ceremony officially 
transfers the vessel to the foreign government. The foreign 
crew then sails the vessel to their home port. The CINCLANFLT 
or CINCPACFLT is the assigned Implementing Agent responsible 
for executing the transfer plan. The following are the main 
features of this type of transfer: 
A "Hot Ship" transfer is the most beneficial method 
for both the U.S. Navy and the foreign government. 
The U.S. Navy saves money that would be expended in 
laying up the ship. The foreign government will 
receive a currently operational asset of the U.S. 
fleet that requires minimal transfer related 
repair/reactivation expenditure on their part. 
They will expend funds, for only performing 
homeward voyage repairs. 
Availability of USN crew provides valuable on-the- 
job training (OJT). 
Allows the foreign crew to conduct at-sea training 
with U.S. Navy assets. 
Combines decommissioning/transfer ceremony. 
Although a "Hot Ship" transfer is preferred, if 
time does not permit an orderly turnover to occur, 
it should be avoided as it can tie up fleet assets 
needed to support USN obligations and requirements. 
Preparation time is constrained in time by ship 
decommissioning date. 
Figure 7 depicts the detailed process for this kind of 
ship transfer method. 
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b. "Hot Ship" Transfer With Follow-On Industrial 
Availability 
This method of transfer has the same advantages of 
the previous process.  Additionally, it provides the customer 
country an opportunity to perform shipyard level repairs and 
modernization after acceptance of the ship.  The U.S. Navy 
benefits by having leased ships upgraded at no additional 
cost.  One disadvantage with this method however, is the fact 
that the customer country must expend more finances. The 
transfer management responsibilities pass from the fleet CINC 
to NAVSEASYSCOM after decommissioning of the ship.  Figure 8 
depicts the flow process for the transfer and Follow-On 
Industrial Availability. 
c. wCold Ship" Transfer - "As Is, Where Is" 
"Cold Ship" refers to a deactivated ship that is 
moth-balled in a storage facility. This method allows 
transference of the ship in its current deactivated state - 
"as is, where is." Since the ship is removed from the 
Inactive Fleet safe stowage and is transferred directly to the 
foreign government, this method of transfer normally consists 
of purchasing the ship and it's onboard repair parts, fuel, 
lube oil, and other provisions. If the ship cannot get 
underway, it is necessary to arrange for the transportation, 
(i.e., tow, heavy lift) of the vessel back to the purchasing 
country. For all "Cold Ship" transfers, the Navy IPO assigns 
the Implementing Agency responsibilities to NAVSEASYSCOM which 
provides for all transfer services and support on a cost- 
reimbursement basis through an FMS case. The followings are 
the main features of this type of transfer: 
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Although this method is less costly than other 
transfer methods, the recipient navy has no 
assurance that the ship will be operational. 
Transfer schedule is not time constrained by fleet 
operations. 
No industrial work is performed except to ensure 
that the vessel can be transported safely from the 
U.S. and that all required equipment removals are 
completed. 
The transfer ceremony is not required unless it is 
requested by the customer country. 
Figure 9 provides an overview of the general process in 
executing this transfer. 
d.   "Cold Ship" Transfer With Minimal Reactivation 
This method of transfer provides the minimum 
acceptable effort for a "Cold Ship" vessel leased to a foreign 
government. Generally, the cold-ship is taken from an 
Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (INACTSHIPACT) and acti- 
vated to a safe to steam status by correcting deficiencies in 
the navigation, engineering, damage control and fire fighting 
areas. This enables the ship to safely sail back to the 
receiving country where the country can continue other 
repairs/modernization activities with their own assets at 
their own pace. As a main advantage, the foreign country 
receives an operational vessel from the U.S. Navy at a 
relatively low cost. The NAVSEASYSCOM is designated as the 
Implementing Agent and is responsible for executing the 
transfer. The full range of transfer services is provided to 
include logistics, and training. Figure 10 provides an over- 
view of the general process in executing this transfer. 
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e. "Cold Ship" Transfer With Full Reactivation 
This method of transfer is generally the most 
expensive. However, it provides the foreign country with a 
fully operational ship that should require minimal industrial 
maintenance for several years after completion of the 
transfer. This effort contains similar elements as in the 
preceding method except the scope of work and associated 
problems will be much greater. . Normally all combat systems 
are made fully operational and many mission related system and 
equipment are modernized to the extent funded by the recipient 
country. This method is riot time constrained by USN require- 
ments and usually takes a year or more to execute. This 
should permit better planning and more opportunity for foreign 
crew members to complete formal schools as well as team 
training. The NAVSEASYSCOM is designated as the Implementing 
Agent. This type of transfer effort will be similar to a 
complex overhaul of an active U.S. Navy ship. Figure 11 
depicts the flow process for the transfer to be accomplished. 
C.   THE SHIP TRANSFER PROCESS 
Ship transfers are complex transactions which require 
coordination among many U.S. Navy organizations and the 
customer country. Planning for transfer, and preparation of 
the ship for transfer must begin before final authorization 
for the transfer is obtained. Consequently, some actions are 
required before the transfer is actually directed. This 
section describes the basic transfer process necessary to 
successfully complete the turnover of a U.S. Navy ship to 
customer navy. Figure 12 depicts a flow chart for the ship 
transfer process and the Appendix at the end of this thesis 
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provides a detailed information for each step shown on the 
flow chart. 
1. The Planning Phase 
Prior to a vessel being offered for transfer certain 
decisions and administrative prerequisites must be met. The 
ship availability studies, the ship disposition reviews(SDR), 
the board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspections and 
CNO certifications are required, time consuming events needed 
to permit the transfer process to proceed. The ship decision 
matrix in Figure 13 outlines these decision sequences and 
Appendix provides detailed information pertaining to these 
actions. 
2. The Ship Offer Phase 
The process leading to the offer of ships for sale or 
lease to foreign countries begins with a collection of 
requests, normally over a period of years, from the foreign 
governments. After the SDR is approved by the CNO making the 
ships available for foreign transfer, and the proper navy 
certification/authorizations are received, the Navy IPO and 
OPNAV initiate the process to offer ships to specific 
countries. This leads to CNO formal invitations to customer 
navies to undertake the ship transfers. 
The foreign navy requests can be in the form of formal 
written documents to any level in the U.S. Government or 
informal verbal exchanges that filter down to the Navy IPO 
when a U.S. dignitary returns from a formal visit. 
Upon approval by SECDEF to extend offers, OPNAV in 
coordination with the Navy IPO will  draft a letter to the 
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Figure 13.  Ship Disposition Decision Matrix 
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foreign country CNO (or equivalent) . The letter will be 
signed by CNO and forwarded through security assistance 
channels to ensure the U.S. Ambassador and Defense Attache are 
in concurrence. This offer to undertake the ship offer 
includes several points: 
• Identifies the specific ships offered. 
• States the transfer is subject to congressional 
approval. 
• States Navy IPO will contact their government 
representative to provide background information, 
set up a ship inspection visit, host a conference 
to discuss transfer details and discuss costs. 
After the CNO offers are forwarded to the foreign govern- 
ment, the Navy IPO works with NAVSEASYSCOM, INACTSHIPSOM, 
NAVSUPSYSCOM, NETSAFA, and appropriate systems command organ- 
izations to develop a schedule that will allow inspections of 
ships and follow up formal technical briefings in an orderly 
fashion over the next 6-8 months. 
The ship visit information is sent to the foreign office 
considered most appropriate by Navy IPO to facilitate the 
process, with copies to other key organizations. Although at 
any time in the process the foreign government may withdraw 
their request for a ship or decline the CNO offer, this is the 
first time they are faced with spending money on the project. 
Therefore many foreign governments decline the transfer offer 
or request a delay in the proposal visit/briefing at this 
point.  Figure 14 outlines the offer process defined above. 
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3.  Ship Inspections and Formal Briefings Phase 
A physical inspection of each ship offered for transfer 
is required so that the foreign government representatives can 
assess the physical condition of the vessels. It also serves 
to introduce the custodial activity to the foreign Navy and 
the FMS/FML transfer process. The inspections are normally 
held at fleet locations, Navy Inactive Ship Maintenance 
Facilities, or Maritime Administration (MARAD) facilities. 
Within a day or two following the ship inspections, 
formal transfer briefings will be held at the Navy IPO/ 
NAVSEASYSCOM. These briefings will outline in detail the 
transfer process, a general transfer plan, technical details 
on the key systems and equipment on the ships, available 
training and follow-on support. A desirable result of the 
discussions is to find out what the foreign country desires in 
terms of training, logistics, and pre/post transfer repairs or 
upgrades. Information gathered during these exchanges will be 
important in the development of lease/sale agreements the 
transfer plan and LOA's used to provide services/support. 
The final action in this preliminary step in the transfer 
process is the most important. The Navy IPO will solicit a 
formal commitment from the foreign government that they are 
interested in pursuing the ship transfer. Normally, the 
country response is in the form of a Letter of Request (LOA) . 
Having seen the ships and been presented with the facts and 
costs associated with the sale or lease, each foreign 
government must decide if they have the assets necessary to 
succeed. Their in-country facilities, number and quantity of 
personnel, and available budget authority may fall short of 
55 
o . al ri
si l in o ra
e h ig e t t t
h si l i o h ssel .
ntrod h i l h g
h FM ra ss. n all
, t i aint
acilit , ari im dministrat M n) il
it i  w low t s,
l ra n ill a /
. n ill t t il
ra ess,  er l ra l , i l t il
e ent i s, i l
rainin low ort. si l lt
n t hat t si
er , isti , r / st i r
rades. at t r es ill  
port t ent f / l  ents
l A's i  i port. 
 l t i i     r 
s  ost portant. e a   ill li it 
al it ent ro ent t   
  r i   i  sfer. ormally,  
ntr      f ett r f equest )  
avi    i    r t  it   t  
st  i t  it   l  r se,   
r ent ust i      s t  cess r   
eed. heir t  cilit , ber  antit  f 
er nnel,  ail l  dget t orit  ay ll ort f 
 
the significant infrastructure required to support addition- 
ally ships. 
From the U.S. Navy perspective this official assurance is 
important before initiating the Congressional notification/ 
legislation necessary to authorized the transfer. It is the 
U.S. Navy policy to avoid the time consuming and politically 
sensitive step of proposing legislation before Congress if 
they are not sure the country .wants to proceed. Figure 15 
outlines the inspections/briefings decision sequences. 
4.   Congressional Approval and Sale/Lease Development 
Phase 
Upon completion of the above preliminary phases of the 
ship transfer process the actual implementation of the trans- 
fer is set in motion by the Navy IPO. This includes formally 
assigning an Implementation Agent, initiating the Congres- 
sional approval process, and developing many Letter of 
Acceptances(LOA)to support the transfer. 
a. The Implementing Directive 
Although the assignment of the Implementing Agency 
is generally clear prior to the formal ship transfer brief- 
ings, the official assignment normally comes after the foreign 
government confirms their commitment to continue the trans- 
fer. The Navy IPO announces the assignment to the many Navy 
activities involved in the transfer by message, with a general 
outline of the transfer timetable. 
b. Congressional Notification/Legislation 
Often, the greatest obstacle in the transfer process 
is the requirement to obtain Congressional approval of the 
ship transfer.  Title 10, U.S. Code, Article 7307 imposes the 
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requirements.  Figure 16 outlines the provisions of this 
public law. 
NOTIFICATION 
Ship < 3000 Tons, 
AND 
> 20 Years Old 
LEGISLATION 
Ship > 3000 Tons 
OR 
< 20 Years Old 
\                                   • r 
NAVY IPO MEMO REQUESTS 
CONGRESSIONAL 
LEGISLATION / NOTIFICATION 
Figure 16.  Title 10, U.S. Code, Article 7307 
(1) Article 7307  (b)(1).    According to this article, 
a Naval vessel that is in excess of 3000 light tons or less 
than 20 years of age may not be transferred to another nation, 
unless approved by law and enacted by Congress. The main 
disadvantage to this process is that the enacting legislation 
can take 5-7 months.  Figure 17 outlines the Congressional 
legislation process and the Appendix provides a detailed 
information inherent to this article. 
(2) Article 7307(b)(2). Under this article, a Naval 
vessel that is less than 3000 light tons and greater than 20 
years old may be transferred only after the SECNAV has 
notified Congress in writing of the proposal transfer and 30 
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— Senate Foreign Relations 
— House Foreign Affairs 
—Senate Armed Services 
—House Armed Services 
— Others as required 
President Signs Bill 
Enacting Legislation 
Figure 17.  Legislation 
days of continuous session of Congress have expired without 
legislation objecting to the proposed transfers. The notifi- 
cation procedures are normally faster and are much easier to 
anticipate than the time required to enact legislation. 
However, the main disadvantage to this process is that the 
continuity of the 30 days is often difficult to predict and 
must be watched closely as any recess by either House for more 
than 3 days can stop the notification period. Figure 18 
outlines the congressional notification process and the 
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OLA Drafts Notification 
Letter to Congressional 

















30 Day Continuous 
Session of Congress 
concludes without 
Objection to Transfer 
Figure  18.     Notification 
c. Lease Development 
Upon completion of Congressional notification/legis- 
lation requirements, the proposed lease and a determination 
drafted by the Navy IPO are forwarded to Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA) for final approval. Subsequent to 
DSAA approval, the actual lease agreement is signed by the 
appropriate representatives of both countries. 
d. Sale LOA Development 
An Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is used for 
FMS cases to execute the sale. If the LOA is acceptable to 
the purchaser, they have sixty days to complete, sign, and 
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forward it with any required initial payment. The LOA becomes 
a contract when it is accepted an signed by a representative 
of the purchasing nation. 
e.   Support Case LOA Development 
The types and numbers of cases required to support 
both FMS and FML transfers vary, depending on the method of 
transfer described before. Generally, as a result of the 
formal briefings and negotiations, five different types of 
support FMS cases can be developed, offered and accepted by 
the foreign government as part of the transfer. These types 
of support FMS cases include: 
• Technical support cases: Technical Documentation 
Support. 
• Training Cases:  Formal Schools,  Team Training, 
Mobile Training Team (MTT), Fleet Introduction Team 
(FIT) and Tailored Ship Training Assistance (TSTA). 
• Supply cases: COSAL/COSMAL design, repairs, direct 
requisitioning. 
• Fleet  cases:  Voyage  repairs,  Berthing/Messing 
support. 
• Major Availability Cases: Availability of major 
components for replacement and repair. 
5.  Transfer and Subsequent Support Phase 
Subsequent to establishment of transfer method through a 
bilateral agreement between the countries, the actual transfer 
of the ships are executed according to the general provisions 
defined below: 
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a. Delivery Preparations 
The major steps will be the removals of classified 
equipments, establishment of ammunition off-load and/or on- 
load requirements, stores loading for the recipient country, 
provisioning of the ship, preparation for decommissioning/ 
transfer ceremony, and the repair work that is identified in 
the transfer plan or LOA which has been funded by the foreign 
government. The Appendix provides a detailed information on 
these steps. 
b. Foreign Crew Support 
The Implementation Agency is responsible for arrang- 
ing the support for the foreign crew members upon their 
arrival at the transfer site. This entails arranging for 
messing, berthing, transportation, and training coordination, 
providing office space and general support during the trans- 
fer. 
c. Training Support 
Training is handled under a separate FMS case from 
the ship transfer. Prior to ship transfer, a ship transfer 
training plan is developed by NETSAFA. The Implementing Agency 
(IA) is the training coordinator for the foreign crew. As 
such the IA will arrange for and establish liaison with 
appropriate training commands on behalf of the foreign crew. 
Training under the IMET Program, regardless of the method of 
transfer or the legal authority, is paid for by FMS credits. 
Specific issues associated with training are discussed in the 
Appendix. 
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d. Decommissioning and Transfer Ceremony 
The transfer ceremony is normally held concurrent 
with the U.S. Navy decommissioning of the ship. The transfer 
ceremony is required in the case of a "Hot Ship" transfer, and 
may be conducted for other transfers, if it is requested by 
the foreign country. The foreign country takes possession of 
the ship at the conclusion of the U.S. Navy decommissioning 
ceremony. 
e. Transfer Documentation 
A certificate of delivery is provided by the Navy- 
IPO for execution by the officer authorized to turn over the 
ship to the recipient navy. The certification is signed in 
duplicate, by the Implementing Agency and the representative 
of the foreign government during the transfer ceremony. 
f. Status of Ship 
The U.S. Navy maintains the legal responsibility 
until the ship is decommissioned and both parties have signed 
either the Lease Agreement or Sale LOA and the Delivery 
Certificates. After a "Hot Ship" transfer, the ship proceeds 
under the flag and command of the foreign navy commanding 
officer as a commissioned ship of the recipient navy. If the 
ship is transferred from an inactive status, it becomes the 
legal responsibility of the recipient government after" 
delivery. 
g. Homebound Logistics and Communications Support 
Logistics  and  communications  support  for  the 
homebound voyage is authorized in SECNAVINST 4900.48. Such 
support is provided under FMS and is priced in accordance with 
the FMS Financial Management Manual (DOD 7290.3M).   Spare 
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parts and consumables needed can be requisitioned through the 
U.S. Navy supply system by the foreign crew on a "fill or 
kill" basis on cost-reimbursable basis after transfer. 
However, this is not authorization for routine replenishment 
of spares by the foreign country. Routine replenishment, 
whether for a short or long periods, based on the desires of 
the foreign country is purchased under a separate FMS spares 
replenishment case. 
j.  Ship■s Departure 
After completion of the transfer ceremony and 
signing of the delivery certificates, the recipient may take 
the ships to its homeport at the time decided by the country. 
D.   FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT 
Follow-on support consists of a wide range of available 
services. Although normally focused on repair parts, it can 
also include industrial, technical, training, and documenta- 
tion services. United States Navy support can usually .be 
provided, if it is separately requested and funded by the 
foreign country. The Appendix provides an in-depth discus- 
sion of follow-on support issues. 
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IV.  CASE ANALYSIS:   TURKISH KNOX CLASS FRIGATE 
TRANSFER PROGRAM 
A.   TURKISH NAVY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
Turkey has been a key ally of the United States for 
decades, and is one of the most strategically important 
countries in the world. Its strategic importance lies in the 
ability to guard the southeaster flank of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the critical passage from the 
Black Sea into the Mediterranean. During any hostility, 
unfriendly forces would have to pass through this critical 
passage to reach the Turkish Straits. Consequently, if 
attacked by former Warsaw Pact nations, Turkey could find 
itself facing a land war on two fronts and a naval obligation 
to block the Turkish Straits. Thus, Turkey alone has the 
responsibility of defending potentially one-third of NATO's 
front. This is an enormous task, especially given the fact 
that this country is one of the poorest members of NATO, and 
is one that uses outmoded weaponry.  [Ref. 21:p. 974] 
Beginning in 1985, Turkey has sought to improve its 
defensive posture by developing a fifteen-year Strategic 
Defense Modernization Plan that included the improvement of 
its navy. From the Turkish Navy perspective, this plan led to 
the construction of new frigates, submarines, and the 
acquisition of eight ex-Knox class frigates obtained through 
lease from the United States. All of these modernization 
activities have virtually remade the Turkish Navy into a 
modern force, capable of extended operations in support of 
national and NATO missions. 
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B.   KNOX CLASS SHIP TRANSFER PROGRAM 
1.   Background 
In the early 1990s, the Turkish Naval Fleet was mainly 
comprised of World War II (WWII) vintage destroyers. As these 
former U.S. ex-Gearing and ex-Carpenter class destroyers aged 
and their maintenance costs grew, the Turkish Navy began 
looking for replacements. Initially, Perry class frigates 
from the U.S. Navy were preferred because of their modern 
combat systems and gas turbine power plants. However, since 
these ships were not yet available for FMS/FML in late 1992, 
Turkey asked for eight excess Knox class frigates from the 
U.S. and committed $300 million for their lease and outfitting 
costs. 
The FF-1052 Knox Class Frigate is one of the three Fast 
Frigates (FF) class of ships in the U.S. Navy. These ships 
have primarily an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission by 
design and all contain the AN SQS-26 active search and attack 
sonar, Anti-Submarine rocket (ASROC) launcher and torpedo 
tubes. In addition to these ASW weapons and systems, these 
ships were modified in early 1980s to accommodate one Light 
Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) SH-2 ASW helicopter. 
The FF-1052 class frigates have a fairly limited anti-air 
warfare (AAW) capability with each ship having only one 5"/54 
gun forward. However, with the latest modifications, this 
limitation was minimized by the accommodation of HARPOON 
guided-missiles and PHALANX close-in weapon systems (CIWS). 
The length of the ship is 43 8 feet long. It cruises at a 
maximum speed of 28 knots, displaces 4260 tons, has a single 
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propeller shaft and operates with a 1200 lb. steam engine 
[Ref. 22:p.  708] . 
The Knox class of ships comprises the largest group of 
Frigate type warships built to the same design in the U.S. 
since WWII. These ships require extensive periodic overhauls, 
mainly resulting from the maintenance requirements of 1200 
lbs. steam plants. They came equipped with the Tactical Data 
System (TDS), that is designed to bring a more accurate, 
rapid, and complete exchange of tactical data and command/ 
control information for the ships in its ASW mission. 
2.   History of the Transfer 
a.   Negotiation Phase 
Negotiations to obtain the Knox class ships by 
Turkey began with correspondence between Turkey and the U.S. 
Government. In late 1992, the Turkish Defense Minister 
expressed Turkey's interest in obtaining Knox class frigates 
from the United States. As a result of this expressed 
interest, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) sent a 
letter to the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces. This 
letter stated that he had recommended to the U.S. Secretary of 
the Navy for the transfer of eight Knox class frigates [Ref. 
23 :p. 1] . Subsequent to this initial dialog, a Letter of 
Offer was sent to the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces by 
the Navy International Program Office. This letter delineated 
the dates for possible inspections of the ships and stipulated 
that further briefings and negotiations were necessary to 
complete an agreement between the two countries. 
Subsequent to the Letter of Offer, the Turkish Navy 
representatives  inspected the  ships  and conducted ship 
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transfer meetings with the Navy IPO, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) and designated Transfer Implementing Agency 
officials. An agreement was reached between the parties at 
the conclusion of these meetings for the lease (FML) of eight 
ships and the grant of one ship under FMS. 
b.       Congressional Approval 
Following  the  agreement  between  two  navies, 
Congressional approval to transfer these ships was obtained by 
the Navy IPO working in concert with Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA).  Public Law 103-54 dated July 28, 
1993 authorized the lease1 of the following ships to Turkey: 
USS Reasoner (FF-1063), USS Fanning (FF-1076), USS Thomas C. 
Hart (FF-1092), and USS Capodanno (FF-1093) .  The lease period 
for the ships was five years, authorized under Chapter 6 of 
the Arms Expert Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2796) .  The same public 
law also authorized an FMS grant of USS Elmer Montgomery (FF- 
1082) under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321), relating to transfers of excess defense 
articles.  The ship was granted as a spare parts/logistics 
resource vessel.  Public Law 103-174 dated December 2, 1993 
authorized the lease of another four ships to Turkey.  These 
ships were the Knox class frigates USS Bowen (FF-1079) , USS 
McCandless (FF-1084), USS Donald B. Beary (FF-1085), and USS 
Ainsworth (FF-1090).  These ships were also leased to Turkey 
for five years. 
c.     Implementation of Transfer 
The FML of Knox class ships was drafted in 
accordance with DOD 5105.38, SECNAVINST 4900.48, and occurred 
as cost-reimbursement contracts between Turkey and the U.S. 
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Government. The lease period was for five years, the 
conclusion of which Congress could authorize a renewal or 
confiscate the ships. The leases were eight page documents 
that consisted of two pages for the signed contract with 
another six pages for general provisions, clauses, and payment 
schedules. The basic lease document stipulated an agreement 
between the two countries on the following issues: rental 
charge of the ships, lease period of five years, delivery of 
the ships from the ports of Norfolk and San Diego, and 
Certificate of Delivery confirming transfer of ships to 
Turkey. The six-page attachments of general provisions 
included agreements on the following issues: renewal terms of 
the lease, risk of loss, ship operations and use, initial 
condition of the ship, transfer costs, indemnification, 
inspections, maintenance, alterations, termination of lease, 
place of redelivery, ship title, proprietary rights, and 
reports of the ship condition. 
One clause inherent in the lease specified that all 
eight ships would immediately transfer in a "Hot Ship" 
(active) status. As stated previously, a "Hot Ship" transfer 
is the least expensive transfer method for a foreign 
government, since the ship is in an active operational status. 
As part of the "Hot Ship" process, the leased ships were 
manned by the U.S. Navy personnel until the decommissioning/ 
transfer ceremony officiated the transfer of the ships from 
the U.S. Navy to the Turkish Navy. 
As part of the "Hot Ship" transfer process, 13 FMS 
cases were established, covering all aspects of the transfer 
including training, supply support, weapons, post-transfer 
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repairwork, and Turkish shipyard improvements. Subsequent to 
completion of all legal authorizations, actual transfer of the 
ships were conducted in two batches, comprised of four ships 
in each batch. Transfers occurred in accordance with the 
current U.S. Ship Transfer Program directives that are 
explained in the previous chapter. The first four ships were 
commissioned into the Turkish Navy in November 1993, and the 
second batch of four in July 1994. Since their turnover, the 
ships have operated safely and reliably, and significantly 
increased the capabilities of the Turkish Navy. 
Although the overall ship transfer processes were 
conducted successfully, there were several problematic issues. 
These problems jeopardized the effective implementation of the 
FMS/FML ship procurement process. The following sections 
identify and discuss the major transfer problems inherent in 
the Turkish Knox class frigate procurement and the lessons 
learned from the process. 
C.   ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER PROBLEMS 
1.   Training 
A major problematic area associated with either a "Hot 
Ship" or "Cold Ship" transfer includes the type of training 
necessary for the recipient navy to assume safe control of the 
vessels. Both formalized "schoolhouse" and informal "on-the- 
job" training are critical elements of the transfer, and 
potential sources of issues needing resolution. For example, 
during the conduct of the "Hot Ship" transfers between the 
U.S. and Turkey, Turkish crews were given both formal and 
informal training sessions. Several systems endemic to the 
Knox class frigates required that individuals be graduates of 
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formal courses before the new crew member could adequately 
operate the equipment. This was particularly true of the 
steam system, the weapons and the sonar. But, some of the 
formalized training consisted of courses more than one year in 
length. Training for the steam system of Knox class ships, 
for example, was over one year in length. It was necessary 
for Turkish sailors to receive this training, since the steam 
systems were 1200 lbs. (psi), versus Turkey's previous 
experience with only 600 lbs.(psi) steam engines. Because of 
this new type of engine, all engineer personnel needed 
extensive steam engine training. But, it was not always 
possible for the sailors to receive this training, due to 
other circumstances. 
One such circumstance concerns political factors that 
impacted on the training decisions. In order to ensure a 
"safe-to-sail" and "combat-ready" shipboard environment, 72 
personnel/ship were planned to receive advanced skill training 
prior to reporting to the ships. Additionally, another 150 
personnel per ship were planned to receive team and short term 
training during ship introduction exercises. However, due to 
the high interest in the program, there were policy decisions 
to accelerate decommissioning/transfer of the ships. The 
implementation schedule of the training was significantly 
impacted. As a result, to fit the training program to 
accelerated transfer timelines, some of the Turkish Navy 
personnel had to report to their ships before the completion 
of their formal school training. Also, some of the high risk 
training involving damage control and fire fighting had to be 
canceled.  These examples highlighted the adverse effects of 
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political interest and unanticipated schedule changes on the 
effective implementation of the training program, and also 
revealed some of the many training issues that must be 
resolved for successful ship transfer.  [Ref. 24:p. 3] 
In addition to training problems discussed above was the 
closure of U.S. naval training facilities that were providing 
extensive training for the foreign crews. The U.S. Navy's 
ability to execute the transfer of decommissioned ships to 
foreign navies is being jeopardized by the deactivation of 
many formal training courses. For example, although the 
required funds were committed by the Turkish Navy, eight 
different formal school courses were canceled, as the U.S. 
Navy retired its last Knox class ships. These courses were 
necessary for improving the Turkish crew ability to 
effectively operate the ship systems, but were both canceled 
due to the closure of U.S. Navy training bases at Orlando and 
San Diego. [Ref. 25:p. 4] This problematic issue requires 
U.S. Government action and support for the successful 
accomplishment of existing and potential future FMS/FML ship 
transfer programs. 
Another problematic area concerned the depth and breath 
of training received by the Turkish Navy personnel. Current 
U.S. policies relating to ship transfers stipulate limitations 
pertaining to training. According to policy guidelines, both 
formal and informal "on-the-job" training and associated 
documentation taught to foreign crews are limited only to 
teaching those elements necessary to allow the safe operation 
of the ship and weapon systems. However, the detailed 
explanation on limitations of training is not defined and is 
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left open to the discretion of the implementing agencies. 
Thus, Turkish Navy personnel neither received in-depth 
instruction on weapons system employment, nor on sonar systems 
acoustic analysis and signal recognition. Most of the 
training was limited to only basic operation and maintenance 
of the ships. This limitation on in-depth weapon systems 
training posed a frustration between the two countries during 
the implementation of the training program. It is believed 
that these problems were primarily caused by two factors: the 
unclear U.S. policy guidelines pertaining to the transfer of 
ships, and by the limited experience with regard to "Hot 
Ships" transfers of both the U.S. Navy Transfer Implementing 
Agency and the Turkish Navy. 
Another transfer problem related to training resulted 
from the doctrinal differences between the two navies. 
Turkish Navy is structured upon European naval philosophy of 
"Specialization"  versus  the  U.S.  Navy  philosophy  of 
"Generalization" of surface line officers.  This doctrinal 
difference affected conduct of shipboard engineering training. 
For example, the U.S. Navy expects the bridge/CIC officers to 
have a basic understanding of engineering plant operations 
and how a particular engineering casualty will impact the 
ship's combat posture [Ref. 25:p. 2].  Turkish line officers, 
however, are specialized and only have knowledge in their 
field of duty.   In order to minimize this difference in 
training, it is crucial that the U.S. Navy non-engineering 
officers conduct cross cultural "on-the-job" training with 
their recipient navy counterparts. 
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During the implementation of the training programs, 
communication barriers presented another problem. The limited 
number of interpreters at waterfront schools (e.g., general 
fire fighting) was a barrier to learning. Since "Hot Ship" 
transfers required Turkish Navy personnel to work along side 
their U.S. counterparts, more interpreters were required than 
were provided. Thus, communication barriers were a hindrance 
to effective transfer of information. In order to minimize 
this problem, two things are important: first, the U.S. Navy 
should provide a sufficient number of contracted interpreters 
to waterfront schools; second, the recipient navy should 
improve the English comprehension level of personnel selected 
to participate in training program before their arrival in the 
United States. 
2.   Technical 
One of the transfer problems was caused by the lack of 
technical information provided for the effective operation of 
sonar systems. Since Turkish Navy had no prior experience 
with the operation of AN SQS-26 sonar, technical information 
pertaining to the system was officially requested by the 
Turkish Navy representatives during the technical meetings. 
This information included technical characteristics and 
capabilities of the sonar system, such as receiving 
sensitivity and noise level detection. However, this request 
was not approved, because current U.S. Navy ship transfer 
policies prohibits release of confidential classified 
information. According to SECNAVINST 4900.48, technical 
information on acoustic  analysis and signal  recognition is 
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identified  as  confidential  information  and  cannot  be 
disseminated. 
Currently, the Turkish Naval shipyards lack experience 
with these sonar systems; and they lack the specialized 
testing equipment needed to conduct the necessary testing to 
obtain information on the systems capabilities. But the U.S. 
has both. Additionally, the U.S. Navy has previous test and 
evaluation data on the equipment that could provide valuable 
insight into the operational capabilities of the system. 
However, current policies prohibit the USG from providing this 
data to the recipient country. Consequently, this information 
is discarded with the elimination of Knox Class Frigates from 
the U.S. ship inventory. As a result, the Turkish Navy is 
currently experiencing technical problems with respect to 
effective employment of AN SQS-26 sonar systems. 
Another technical problem was in the area of coordinating 
the communications support for the Turkish Navy ships. 
Normally, communications support for transferred ships 
following sail away for home is addressed during technical 
briefings. However, in the case of the first batch of four 
ships, the issue was not addressed or coordinated during these 
briefings. Consequently, two of these ships communicative 
abilities encountered interference, and thus were unable to 
send message traffic. 
3.   Logistics 
Unanticipated changes to original transfer timelines may 
sometimes severely effect logistics planning. During the 
implementation of the transfer program, the TN Headquarters 
made a unilateral change in the sail away dates for the TCG 
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ADATEPE and TCG KOCATEPE. This change caused both of the 
ships to sail back to Turkey earlier than U.S. logistics 
planning had anticipated. Consequently, this change severely 
effected logistic planning of the U.S. officials, since NAVSEA 
and Fleet Industrial Support Center (RISC) based much of their 
actions on the original dates. As a result, TCG KOCATEPE (Ex- 
USS Reasoner) carried supply parts/material to Turkey for TCG 
ADATEPE (Ex - USS Fanning) and items for TCG KOCATEPE (Ex - 
USS Reasoner) were shipped by other means, with an additional 
cost to Turkey. [Ref. 26] Thus, unilateral, unplanned 
changes in the transfer timelines made a significant negative 
impact on the transfer process. 
Another logistics problem concerned the differences in 
the levels of the Coordinated Ship Allowance Lists (COSAL) of 
the ships transferred from Norfolk and San Diego Naval Bases. 
Coordinated Ship Allowance Lists are comprised of various 
quantities of ship repair parts, consumables and logistical 
sustainment packages. In the Turkish ship transfer case, 
those ships transferred from Norfolk, as compared to San 
Diego, had a higher level of COSAL equipment. In the existing 
system, since the current ship transfer documents are not 
explicitly defined, with regard to COSAL levels and ship 
types, the levels vary from ship to ship. Because of these 
differences in the COSAL levels, Turkey incurred additional 
costs.  [Ref. 27] 
The other important transfer problem associated with 
logistics was caused by the quality of ammunition supplied 
with the transferred ships. Currently, in the U.S. Navy 
Ammunition Supply System, munitions are classified as A, B, C, 
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D, or E according to their production date and the results of 
periodic tests.  Although classes A, B, and C are mainly 
qualified as usable, the best results are obtained from class 
A ammunition.  In the Turkish ship transfer case, the quality 
of ammunition that was to be supplied with the ships was not 
explicitly stated in the original lease agreement. Thus, 
during the ammunition on-load of the ships, issues resulting 
from  the  quality  of  ammunition  created  problems  and 
frustration between Turkish and U.S. officials. 
4.   Management and Accounting of FMS Funds 
Another major transfer problem is the management of FMS 
funds.  According to the current Security Assistance System, 
information concerning the usable level of FMS funds is under 
the total control of U.S. officials.  Thus, after an FMS case 
is established,  the recipient country must rely on the 
information provided by the U.S. officials to track the 
expenditure of their funds.  However, any problem resulting 
from the mismanagement of the U.S. accounting system may 
adversely impact on the implementation of the ship transfers. 
For example, during the post-transfer sonar system repair work 
of TCG ZAFER, the repair activities were temporarily stopped 
by the U.S.  Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMAV) 
activity for 15 days.  The reason for stoppage, as announced 
by the maintenance activity officials,  was due to the 
unavailability of funds in the established FMS case accounts. 
However, at the end of 15 days, it was revealed that money was 
available.  The actual problem was inaccurate accounting by 
the U.S. Navy, and the repair work then resumed.  However, due 
to this unexpected delay, and the existing transfer timeline 
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constraints, some parts of the system could not be repaired. 
Allowing the recipient navy officials to participate in 
monitoring of FMS accounting systems could have been effective 
in the minimization of future problems. 
5. Long-Term Technical/Logistics Supportability 
A major source of problems associated with the transfer 
of Knox Class Frigates to Turkey includes the long-term 
technical/logistics supportability of the ships. In light of 
military downsizing and the subsequent reduction of U.S. Naval 
forces, Knox class ships were scheduled for decommissioning 
and transfer to security assistance customers beginning in 
1993. Due to the elimination of these ships from the active 
U.S. Navy inventory, equipment and support facilities unique 
to these vessels were also discontinued from operational use. 
Examples of discontinued equipment and corresponding support 
facilities include: in-service engineering activities, depots 
supporting ASW and Gun/Fire Control equipment, and spare parts 
unique to the Knox Class Frigates. Moreover, these were 
eliminated before customers had an opportunity to identify 
their requirements. [Ref. 28:p. 2] Thus, the current 
downsizing of the U.S. defense industrial complex is of great 
concern to Turkey, and the other ten countries that have 
already procured these ships. Obviously, this trend may have 
tremendous adverse effects on the long-term supportability of 
the ships. Future sustainment concerning the operational 
availability of these ships by the customer countries mainly 
requires technical assistance and spares requisitioning 
provided by the United States. In 1994, an FMS contract was 
signed between the U.S. and Turkey for the provision of 
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follow-on technical/logistics support for ships including 
material support, technical assistance and program management 
support. However, in light of current U.S. military 
downsizing and the resulting uncertainty in the future 
capability of the U.S. defense industrial base, Turkey 
anticipates future supportability problems, since some 
contractual aspects may not be performable in the future. 
[Ref. 29:p. 3] 
D.   LESSONS LEARNED 
This section assists in answering the primary thesis 
question and discusses the important lessons learned from the 
analysis of the Turkish Knox Class Frigate ship transfer 
program. 
1.   FML Benefited Both Turkey and the U.S. 
Foreign Military Leases afforded Turkey the opportunity 
to obtain a class of ships that otherwise would not have been 
available to them. Since eight of the nine Knox class ships 
did not meet the FMS criteria, a lease was the only possible 
means of obtaining the ships. Further, the cost of leasing 
as opposed to buying was less expensive. Leasing eight 
operational U.S. Knox class frigates, including all transfer 
related activities and ammunition cost only $213 million. On 
the other hand, buying one ship, including the ammunition, 
through FMS would have cost approximately $450 million. 
Consequently, the FML allows Turkey to replace its WW II 
vintage ships with modern frigates cheaply and quickly. 
Additionally, the U.S. benefited by keeping a ship operational 
that ultimately could be recalled. 
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2. "Hot Ship" is the Most Beneficial Transfer Method 
The Hot ship method of transfer was beneficial to both 
the Turkey and the United States. Turkey was afforded eight 
operational ships and did not have to finance reactivation and 
reoutfitting costs. Using the "Hot Ship" method of transfer 
saved Turkey approximately $80 million. Additionally, on-the- 
job training provided an extensive opportunity for Turkish 
Navy crew to interact with their U.S. Navy counterparts, who 
had experience with ship operations. The U.S. Navy also 
benefited from Hot Ship transfer methods because deactivation 
activities and associated costs were nonexistent. This saved 
the U.S. from financing deactivation activities that would 
have included: stripping of the ship's equipment, sanitiza- 
tion of all documentation and materials, decommissioning and 
storage. 
3. The Scheduling of Schools Must Be Improved 
For example, in the Turkish Knox class ship transfer 
case, general fire fighting quotas were not arranged until 
after the arrival of Turkish Navy crews. Further, automatic 
boiler control technician schooling conflicted with shipboard 
on-the-job training (OJT). These problems were temporarily 
absorbed by reschedule/cancel of U.S. Navy general fire 
fighting quotas and scheduling of shipboard automatic boiler 
control training on evenings and weekends. If the Turkish 
Navy automatic boiler control technicians had been in schools 
out-of-area, vital shipboard on-the-job training would have 
been lost. Thus, the scheduling of schools is of critical 
importance and must be improved. 
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4. Exogenous Factors Can Influence the Implementation 
of the Training Program 
Political interest on the program, unilateral transfer 
schedule accelerations, and the limited experience of both the 
implementing agency and the customer country officials on the 
"Hot Ship" transfer procedures, are the main factors affecting 
administration of ship transfer programs.  Generally, adverse 
effects  of  these  factors  are  reflected  as  extended 
negotiations and frustration between parties. 
5. Future Training Support is Affected by Downsizing 
Closure of the U.S. ^Navy training facilities that were 
providing extensive training of the customer countries are 
seriously hampering the U.S. Navy's ability to sustain the 
FMS/FML ship transfer programs. 
6. Ambiguous Policies are Limiting the Depth and 
Breath of Training 
Current U.S. Naval policies are unclear in their guidance 
pertaining to the level of information provided to the 
recipient country.   Guidelines specify that training is 
limited to only those elements that allow for the safe 
operation of the ship and weapons systems.  However, this 
guidance does not clearly delineate the depth and breath that 
this instruction can cover.  Training details are at the 
discretion of the implementing agencies.  Consequently, this 
problem, coupled with the inexperience in implementing hot 
ship transfers, creates an even worse problem. 
7. Doctrinal Differences Can Effect the Conduct of 
Training 
Differences in doctrine must be taken into considera-tion 
when planning ship familiarization training for the recipient 
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country. Because the U.S. and Turkey did not share the same 
doctrinal philosophies, ship board engineering training was 
severely hampered. 
8. Communication Barriers Limits Learning from Train- 
ing 
The number of interpreters, and the English compre- 
hension level of the foreign crew are important factors that 
should be taken into consideration during the "Hot Ship" 
transfers. Since "Hot Ship" transfers require foreign crew 
interaction with their U.S. Navy counterparts, the level of 
English understood, and the number of available interpreters 
can effect the transfer of information. 
9. Current U.S. Policies Do Not Reflect the Effects of 
Downsizing 
The current U.S. ship transfer policies and regulations 
are limiting the recipient Navy's ability to obtain critical 
technical data and information pertaining to the effective 
operation of ship systems.   However,  since most of the 
recipient navies have no other sources to obtain this vital 
information, they are still relying on the United States.  On 
the other hand, in light of the downsizing of the U.S. 
military, equipment needed to provide long-term support is 
discarded before the recipient navies have the opportunity to 
identify their needs. 
10. Technical Briefings Should Include Communication 
Issues 
Technical briefings should be the negotiation forums 
where all parameters inherent to the transfer are discussed. 
One important parameter includes the communications support 
for the transferred ships.  If these important issues are not 
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addressed during these meetings, adverse conditions may occur 
as it did in the Turkish case. 
11. Unilateral  Changes  to  the  Transfer  Timeline 
Negatively Affects Logistics Planning 
Unilateral changes to the transfer timeline have a major 
effect on logistics planning.   If the recipient country 
changes the transfer timelines, the U.S. logistics system 
cannot respond quickly.  Thus, before implementing changes to 
the  schedule,  the  recipient  country  should  take  into 
consideration the potential additional costs resulting from 
these schedule changes. 
12. Level of COSAL Equipment May Vary from Ship to Ship 
The current ship transfer documents are not explicitly 
defined with regard to level of COSAL equipment. Thus, in the 
absence of standards, recipient countries may have to incur 
additional costs, to bring the COSAL levels up to required 
quantities. 
13. Class and Quality of Ammunition Transferred Should 
be Stated in the Lease Agreement 
Provision of ammunition issues should be clearly 
addressed during the transfer meetings and should be expli- 
citly stated in the lease agreement. The absence of clear 
statements regarding munitions issues, can result in the 
provision of a lower quality ammunition as occurred in the 
Knox Class FML case. 
14. Tracking of Funds  is a Major Hurdle  for  the 
Recipient Country 
Exclusive control of FMS funds by the U.S. can cause 
adverse problems in the successful fulfillment of the FMS 
agreement.   As it was experienced in the Turkish case, 
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inaccurate reporting of funds in the accounting system caused 
the incompletion of repair work. Since the U.S. did not allow 
external monitoring of their accounting systems, the recipient 
country could not ascertain their financial status with 
respect to the repair work. 
15. Follow-on Technical/Logistics Support Is Waning 
In light of U.S. military downsizing and the resulting 
uncertainty in the future capability of the U.S. defense 
industrial base it is becoming harder to answer the future 
spare parts requisition and technical assistance needs of the 
customer countries. Certainly, this situation may impact the 
future operational capabilities of the transferred FMS/FML 
ships. 
16. On-the-Job Training Period Is Too Short 
The existing ship transfer program guidelines requires a 
total of 10 weeks on-the-job training period for "Hot Ship" 
transfers. However, as it was experienced in the Turkish ship 
transfer case, this amount of time may not be enough to ensure 
a "safe-to-sail" and "combat-ready" shipboard environment for 
the foreign crew. The two important hindrances to this 
process are lengthy administrative delays associated with 
legislative requirements and potential overhaul work. 
17. During Ship Transfer Process Maintain Continuity 
During ship transfer transactions, continuity in U.S. 
Navy personnel is vital to maintaining a smooth turnover of 
the ships. As was experienced in the Turkish case, as orders 
came for the U.S. Navy crew members support for Turkish Navy- 
crew members became a problematic issue. 
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E.   SUMMARY 
For years, Turkey has been a key ally of the U.S., who 
has continued to defend the critical southeastern flank of 
NATO. Since 1985, Turkey has improved its defensive posture 
by modernizing its military forces through production and 
acquisition of weapons systems. With respect to Naval 
improvements, Turkey negotiated with the U.S. to acquire eight 
Knox Class frigates, committing. $300 million to lease these 
vessels. The FML for these ships occurred as a cost- 
reimbursement contract, extending for five years. The ships 
transferred in a "Hot Ship" active status and Turkey assumed 
control of these vessels following a decommissioning/commis- 
sioning ceremony. Although the ship transfer process was 
conducted successfully, several problematic issues arose. 
Analysis revealed that these issues included training, 
technical concerns, logistics, management and accounting of 
FMS Funds, and long term technical/logistics supportability 
concerns. Training problems inherent in the ship transfer 
process regarded the breath, depth, length and type of formal 
and informal training necessary for familiarization with the 
equipment, as well as, the availability of existing and future 
training facilities. Additional factors impacting on training 
issues concerned political sensitivity and high interest of 
the program; U.S. policy limitations on teaching weapon 
systems employment; Naval doctrinal differences; and communi- 
cation barriers due to language differences. Technical 
concerns included: the lack of technical information made 
available for operation of the shipboard equipment; the lack 
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of testing data necessary for operational capability assess- 
ments; and the lack of communications coordination support for 
transferred ships. Logistics issues concerned: the adverse 
impact of unanticipated schedule changes on logistics 
planning; differences in the levels of COSAL; and quality of 
ammunition transferred with the ship. Other problematic areas 
include: the management and accounting of FMS funds, and the 
recipient countries inability to monitor their accounts; in 
addition to long-term technical/logistics supportability 
problems associated with the downsizing of the U.S. defense 
industrial base. 
Analysis of the ship transfer case revealed the following 
lessons learned: 
FML Benefited Both Turkey and the U.S. 
"Hot Ship" is the Most Beneficial Transfer Method. 
The Scheduling of Schools Must Be Improved. 
Exogenous Factors Can Influence the Implementation 
of the Training Program. 
Future Training Support is Affected by Downsizing. 
Ambiguous Policies are Limiting the Depth and 
Breath of Training. 
Doctrinal Differences Can Effect the Conduct of 
Training. 
Communication  Barriers  Limits  Learning  from 
Training. 
Current U.S. Policies Do Not Reflect the Effects of 
Downsizing. 
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Technical Briefings Should Include Communication 
Issues. 
Unilateral Changes to Timelines Negatively Affect 
Logistics Planning. 
Level of COSAL Equipment Varies from Ship to Ship. 
Class and Quality of Ammunition Should be Stated in 
the Lease Agreement. 
Tracking of Funds is a Major Hurdle for the 
Recipient Country Follow-on Technical/Logistics 
Support Is Waning. 
On-the-Job Training Period Is Too Short. 
During Ship Transfer Process Maintain U.S. Navy 
Personnel Continuity. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A.   GENERAL 
In the wake of changing hostile world conditions, the 
U.S. has sought to continue friendly relationships with all 
allies through the expedient of it Security Assistance 
programs. With regard to Turkey, the United States has sought 
to strengthen its security ties with this strategically 
important country through the FMS program. In an effort to 
modernization its navy, and enhance the future sustainability 
of their fleet, Turkey obtained nine Knox Class Fast Frigates 
from the United States. The procurement vehicle used for this 
transfer process included an FMS/FML agreement using the "Hot 
Ship" method of transfer. The effectiveness of this transfer 
method was readily evident from the many advantages 
experienced by both countries. 
During the Cold War era, the ship transfer program was 
implemented efficiently to create a "win/win" situation for 
trading countries. However, with the end of the Cold War, the 
U.S. sought to downsize its military. This situation has 
created problematic issues concerning the effective implemen- 
tation of FMS/FML ship transfer programs. Analysis of the 
FMS/FML ship transfer process, with respect to the sale/lease 
of the nine former U.S. Knox Class Frigates to Turkey during 
1993/1994 has confirmed the existence of problematic issues 
and has demonstrated a need to resolve these issues. 
Resolution of these issues will result in improved effective- 
ness of allied countries to procure arms from the U.S. 
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B.   SPECIFIC ISSUES 
As we look toward the future, Security Assistance will 
continue to be an important factor for promoting international 
and regional stability, while enhancing the security of 
allies. Under the umbrella of Security Assistance, the 
program component of FMS/FML is a vital tool for encouraging 
the continued cordial relations among allied and friendly 
nations. Within this program component, the FML, "Hot Ship" 
transfer method, creates the most beneficial conditions for 
both trading countries. However, although the "Hot Ship" 
transfer method is the most beneficial, there are still 
problematic issues requiring resolution. The four major 
issues impacting the ship transfer programs are: 
• The closure of the U.S. Navy training facilities 
that are providing extensive training for the 
recipient navies; 
• The downsizing of the U.S. defense industrial base 
that will provide follow-on technical/logistical 
support to customer countries for effective 
operation of weapon systems; 
• Deficiencies in the existing ship transfer guide- 
lines which cause uncertainty for implementation 
and frustration between trading nations; 
• The limited knowledge and experience of the U.S. 
Implementing Agencies and recipient countries with 
respect to "Hot Ship" transfers. 
With respect to these problematic areas, this thesis has 
proposed several recommendations for the improvement in the 
planning of future FMS/FML ship transfer programs. The key 
considerations for improvement are: 
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All changes to the transfer timeline should be 
coordinated before implementation in order to 
minimize the influence of exogenous factors such as 
political interests. 
The U.S. Navy should provide contractor support for 
training affected by base closures, and allow 
recipient nations to purchase the training systems 
related to the transferred ships. 
Existing policies should be revamped to allow 
recipient navies the flexibility in obtaining tech- 
nical information that is no longer usable for the 
U.S. Navy. 
Training policies should be standardized to reflect 
clear guidance for training of ship systems. 
FMS/FML accounting systems should be made more 
transparent to the recipient navy. 
To minimize future sustainability problems of 
recipient navies, the U.S. should provide spare 
parts ships, in the short term; and the opportunity 
for direct commercial sales from U.S. contractors, 
in the long term. 
A ship transfer timeline should be planned that is 
flexible enough to answer unanticipated contin- 
gencies affecting the implementation of the 
program. 
C.   ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section provides answers to the research questions 
presented in the introduction of this thesis. 
1.   Primary Research Question: 
The primary research question for this thesis is: 
"What    are    the   problematic    issues    involved   with    the 
FMS/FML of nine former U.S.   Knox Class Frigates  to Turkey,  by 
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using the  "Hot Ship"  transfer method  and how can these issues 
be resolved?" 
The analysis conducted on the FMS/FML case, with regard 
to the Turkish Knox Class Frigate transfer, revealed many- 
problematic issues. A listing of these issues is presented 
below: 
School quotas were not arranged until after the 
arrival of Turkish Naval crews. 
Although the required funds were committed by the 
Turkish Navy, eight different formal school courses 
were canceled, due to the closure of U.S. training 
facilities. Schooling conflicted with shipboard 
on-the-job training. 
Political interests on the program caused schedule 
accelerations and resulted in Turkish personnel to 
report to their ships before completion of formal 
school training. 
Unclear U.S. Naval policies limited the depth and 
breath of training received by the Turkish Navy 
crew on weapons system employment. 
Doctrinal differences between the two navies 
affected the conduct of shipboard engineering 
training. 
Limited number of interpreters and the English 
comprehension level of the Turkish crew adversely 
affect on-the-job training sessions. 
Current U.S. ship transfer policy and regulations 
limited the Turkish Navy's ability to obtain 
critical technical data and information pertaining 
to the sonar system. 
Downsizing of the U.S. military caused the equip- 
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discarded before the recipient navies have an 
opportunity to identify their needs. 
Lack of in-depth discussions regarding the communi- 
cations support during technical briefings caused 
communication deficiencies for some ships sailing 
back to Turkey. 
Unilateral changes to transfer timelines by TN 
Headquarters negatively affected the logistics 
support. 
Differences in the level of COSALs of the ships 
transferred caused Turkey to incur additional costs 
to bring the COSAL levels up to required quanti- 
ties . 
Unclear lease agreement stipulations caused a lower 
quality of ammunition to be dispensed to the 
Turkish Navy. 
Inaccurate reporting of FMS funds in the U.S. 
accounting system caused the incompletion of sonar 
system repair work. 
Shrinking of the U.S. defense industrial base has 
caused uncertainty in the future capability of the 
U.S. to support ship transfers. 
The on-the-job training period was too short and 
not extensive enough to allow flexibility in train- 
ing. 
Lack of continuity in U.S. Navy personnel during 
the ship turnover process caused a disruption in 
the ship transfer program. 
2.   Subsidiary Research Questions: 
a. "What Is the Security Assistance Program and 
What Are the Procurement Possibilities Within this Program 
That Are Available  to Foreign  Countries?" 
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Material presented in Chapter II of this thesis 
revealed the following information: 
Security Assistance is an umbrella term for a group 
of programs in which the U.S. provides defense articles, 
military training and other defense related services by grant, 
credit or cash sales/lease to allied nations. 
All procurement of military equipment from the U.S. 
Government to other nations falls within the realm of one of 
the seven Security Assistance programs: 
• FMS/FML and Foreign Military Construction Sales 
Program. 
• The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP or 
FMF) . 
• Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Licensed Under The 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA). 
• The International Military Education and Training 
Program (IMET). 
• The Economic Support Fund (ESF). 
• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). 
• The Nonproliferation And Disarmament Fund. 
b. "What Are the Current FMS/FML Ship Transfer 
Methods and Procedures for the Turnover of Former U.S. Navy 
Vessels to Allied Countries under the provisions of the 
Security Assistance Programs?'' 
Material presented in Chapter III of this thesis 
revealed that there are five basic methods of FMS/FML vessel 
transfers    that    have    developed   from    the    common   processes 
experienced over the last several decades.    These methods are: 
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• "Hot Ship" Transfer Without an Industrial Avail- 
ability. 
"Hot  Ship"  Transfer With  Follow-On  Industrial 
Availability. 
• "Cold Ship" Transfer "As Is, Where Is." 
• "Cold Ship" Transfer With Minimal Reactivation. 
• "Cold Ship" Transfer With Full Reactivation. 
A  diagram depicting  the  current process  is  shown  in  Chapter 
III. 
c. "What Are the Major Features Associated with 
the »Hot Ship- Transfer of U.S. Naval Vessels to Allied 
Countries?" 
Material presented in Chapter III of this thesis 
revealed the following major features: 
A "Hot Ship" transfer is the most beneficial method 
for both the U.S. Navy and the foreign government. 
- U.S. Navy saves money that would be expended in 
moth-balling the ship. 
- The foreign government will receive a currently 
operational asset of the U.S. fleet that requires 
minimal transfer related repair/reactivation 
expenditure on their part. 
- The foreign government will expend funds for only 
performing homeward voyage repairs and logistics 
support. 
Availability of U.S. Navy crew provides valuable 
on-the-job training. 
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"Hot Ship" transfers allow the foreign crews to 
conduct at-sea training with U.S. Navy assets. 
"Hot Ship" transfers are preferred, however, if 
time does not permit an orderly turnover to occur, 
they can tie up fleet assets needed to support U.S. 
Navy obligations and requirements. 
Preparation for transfer is constrained in time by 
the ship decommissioning date. 
Figure   7   (Chapter III)   depicts   the detailed process  for 
"Hot Ship"  ship  transfer method. 
d.        "What Are  the Lessons Learned from  the    FMS/FML 
Ship Transfer Case of  the Knox Class  Frigates  for Turkey?" 
The analysis conducted in Chapter IV, with respect to 
the Turkish Knox class ship transfer case,  revealed the 
following lessons learned: 
• The FML benefited both Turkey and the U.S. 
• "Hot Ship" is the most beneficial transfer method. 
• The scheduling of schools must be improved. 
• Exogenous factors can influence the implementation of 
the training program. 
• Future training support is affected by the U.S. down- 
sizing. 
• Ambiguous policies are limiting the depth and breath 
of training. 
• Doctrinal differences can affect the conduct of train- 
ing. 
• Communication barriers limit learning from training. 
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Current U.S. FMS/FML ship transfer policies do not 
reflect the effects of downsizing. 
Technical  briefings  should  include  communication 
issues. 
Unilateral changes to timelines negatively effect 
logistics planning. 
Level of COSAL equipment varies from ship to ship. 
Class and quality of 'ammunition should be stated in 
the lease agreement. 
Tracking of funds is a major hurdle for the recipient 
country. 
Follow-on technical/logistics support is waning. 
The on-the-job training period is too short. 
During the ship transfer process maintaining contin- 
uity of U.S. Navy personnel is vital. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF FUTURE 
FMS/FML SHIP TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
Based on the analysis of the Turkish Knox class ship 
transfer case presented in Chapter IV of this thesis, this 
chapter proposes the consideration of the following factors for 
the effective implementation of future FMS/FML ship transfer 
programs: 
1.   General Recommendations 
a.   Continue FML Vice FMS 
Leasing can afford recipient nations the opportunity 
to acquire ships that otherwise may not be available to them. 
Additionally, leasing is more beneficial then procuring through 
FMS, due to the savings in cost. 
ib.   Continue   "Hot Ship" Transfers 
The "Hot Ship" method of transfer allows the foreign 
crew to interact with their U.S. Navy counterparts, which in 
turn increases the operational capability of recipient navies. 
Additionally, this method of transfer minimizes the costs for 
trading countries. 
c.       Improve Scheduling of Schools 
To avoid scheduling problems, formal foreign crew 
school training requirements should be scheduled prior to the 
arrival of the foreign crew. Further, schooling should be 
completed 3-4 weeks prior to commencement of at-sea training. 
This will guarantee sufficient vital shipboard training for the 
recipient navy maintenance technicians, who will actually 
perform maintenance repair on shipboard systems following the 
transfer. 
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d. Limit the Influence of Exogenous Factors On The 
Ship Transfer Program Implementation 
In-depth meetings, early in the negotiation process, 
that strive to bring mutually agreeable resolution to minimizing 
the impact of exogenous factors, are critical. Information 
exchange  and  face-to-face  dialog  covering  all parameters 
relevant to the ship transfer process are vital to a smooth ship 
turnover transaction. 
e. Provide Contractor Support for Training That Is 
Affected by Base Closures and Allow Recipient Nations to 
Purchase Training Systems Related to  the Transferred Ships 
As a short-term "solution to U.S. downsizing problems, 
it is proposed that COMNAVSEASYSCOM and NETSAFA agree to 
initiate immediate action to obtain civilian contractor support 
for the training courses that are affected by base closures. 
Also, CNO support is required to ensure training assets will be 
retained and U.S. Navy facilities are provided to support this 
initiative. 
As a long-term solution, the sale/transfer of training 
systems (i.e., operator training simulator) that are identified 
as excess to U.S. Navy needs, should be offered to selected 
foreign navies. Early planning and coordination for system 
transfer and sales can prevent these training systems from being 
destroyed or removed. Additionally, to support this process, 
NETSAFA should develop a Training Systems Disposition Plan that 
addresses available training systems and country specific train- 
ing needs. 
f. Standardize   Training   Policies   to   Reflect   Clear 
Guidance  for Training of Ship Systems 
It  is recommended that the current policies be 
revamped and standardized to provide clear guidance, reflecting 
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the level of information to be provided to the recipient country 
during ship transfers and related training. 
g. Cultural Differences Should be Taken into 
Consideration During Training Planning 
In order to minimize doctrinal problems, it is crucial 
that the U.S. Navy non-engineering officers conduct cross 
cultural on-the-job training with their recipient navy counter- 
parts. 
h. Provide Sufficient Interpreters and Increase the 
English  Comprehension Level  of Recipient Navy Crews 
In order to minimize communication barrier problems, 
it is recommended that the U.S. Navy provides a sufficient 
number of contracted interpreters to waterfront schools and the 
recipient navy improves the English comprehension level of 
personnel selected to participate in the ship transfer program, 
before their arrival to the United States. 
i. Revamp Existing Policies to Allow Flexibility in 
Obtaining Technical Information for Recipient Navies 
There is an urgent need to revamp the U.S. ship 
transfer policies and procedures to allow flexibility for 
recipient navies to obtain critical technical  information 
related to the transferred ships that are no longer needed by 
the U.S. Navy. 
j. Communications Support for Transferred Ships 
Following Sail Away Must be Addressed During Technical Briefings 
In order to avoid potential future problems it is 
recommended that all communications support issues be addressed 
during the technical briefings. 
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k. All Changes to the Transfer Timeline Should Be 
Coordinated Before Implementation 
Without coordination, unilateral schedule changes may 
adversely impact on the execution of logistics support. These 
adverse impacts could include increased transportation costs for 
the recipient navy. 
2. Revise the Current Policies to Require Standard- 
ized Levels of COSAL Equipment  for All  Transferred Ships 
Before transferring the ships, the U.S. Navy must 
ensure that the level of COSAL equipment transferred is 
standardized and meets the recipient navy requirements. 
m. State Class and Quality of Ammunition Transferred 
in  the Lease Agreement 
To avoid potential frustration between trading 
nations, it is recommended that in-depth discussions during the 
pre-implementation transfer meetings, ensue concerning ammuni- 
tion issues. Additionally, class and quality of ammunition 
transferred should be explicitly stated in the lease agreement. 
n. Make the FMS/FML Accounting System More Trans- 
parent 
It is recommended that an amendment to the current 
Ship Transfer policy guidance be created,  that allows the 
customer country to receive financial status updates in the 
accounting system to monitor their financial progress. 
o. To Minimize Future Sustainability Problems of 
Recipient Navies, the U.S. Navy Should Provide Spare Parts Ships 
and the Opportunity for Direct Commercial  Sales 
As a short-term solution to the spare parts requisi- 
tioning problem, one or two non-operational, same class ships 
can be transferred with the other active ships. These ships can 
be utilized as spare parts ship to support the other active 
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ships,  at least until the customer country becomes self- 
sufficient in the production of required spare parts. 
As a long-term solution, the recipient navy should be 
allowed to establish direct contact with the U.S. producer of 
parts. With the help of the U.S. producer, the recipient navy 
may create the required infrastructure in their country, and in 
a couple of years it may become self-sufficient in the 
production of these spare parts. Additionally, technical 
assistance needs of the recipient country can be satisfied with 
the employment of the U.S. contractor who has experience on the 
ship systems. 
p. Lengthen the On-The-Job Training Period 
To ensure a "safe-to-sail" and "combat-ready" ship- 
board environment for the foreign crew, a 12-week (vice 10 week) 
training process is recommended. This 12-week training process 
should include four weeks of initial port training, four weeks 
of underway ship training, and four weeks of maintenance 
training. The added two weeks in the training process would 
provide some flexibility to a demanding transfer schedule and 
allow an extra week of vital underway ship-to-ship training with 
U.S. Navy counterparts, after the turnover of the ships. 
g. Maintain U.S. Navy Personnel Continuity During 
the Ship Transfer Process 
It is recommended not to change U.S. Navy personnel 
involved with the ship transfer process.   When faced with 
military orders that would result in a break in the personnel 
continuity associated with the transfer,  it may be solved 
through the use of U.S. Navy reserve personnel or contractor 
support.  Continuity of U.S. personnel is required to ensure 
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all participants in the transfer process are aware of major 
milestones, and their roles are well known in advance. 
2.   Recommendations for Improving the Ship Transfer Time- 
line 
Ship transfers are complex transactions that require close 
coordination  among many U.S.  Navy organizations  and  the 
recipient country officials.  In this process, a ship transfer 
timeline that has been designed carefully to answer all the 
unanticipated contingencies affecting the implementation is 
vital for the success of the program.   This section makes 
recommendations  for the, improvement of the ship transfer 
timeline. 
Decommissioning and transfer preparation activities 
should commence at least two months prior to recipient 
navy crew arrival. 
Equipment and publication sanitization activities 
should be concluded prior to recipient navy crew 
arrival. 
The commanding officer, the supply officer, the 
operations officer and leading supply and adminis- 
trative personnel of the recipient navy crew, should 
arrive at least two weeks prior to the rest of the 
crew. This situation allows for close liaison work 
with the U.S. Navy crew and base services in 
preparation for crew arrival. 
Berthing arrangements should be established before 
foreign crew's arrival. 
Engineering and other technical personnel should 
arrive early enough to begin familiarization of ship's 
material condition and commence training. 
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Administrative processing for foreign crews should 
take no more than one week. As soon as adminis- 
trative processing is concluded, shipboard on-the-job 
training should commence and should be concluded 
before Decommissioning and Transfer of the ship. 
Conduct ammunition off-load after foreign crew 
arrives. This allows off-load to serve on-the-job 
training for future on-load by foreign crew. 
Four weeks after the foreign crew's arrival, underway 
on-the-job training should commence and last for four 
weeks. 
Following underway on-the-job training, ship should 
enter a four weeks restricted availability to conduct 
any major repair work. At this point in the transfer 
process, foreign crews have a good understanding on 
the material condition of the ship and can properly 
prioritize the repair work. 
Twelve weeks after the foreign crew's arrival, the 
decommissioning and transfer ceremony should be 
executed. 
Approximately one week after the transfer ceremony, 
refresher training should commence. Two weeks of 
duration is sufficient for this activity. 
Immediately upon conclusion of refresher training, the 
ship should proceed to the prearranged weapons station 
for a two-day munitions on-load. 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The  following areas  are  recommendations  for  further 
research: 
Pricing of on-the-job training for ship transfers. 
Current U.S. Navy ship transfer policies are not 
explicitly defined for the pricing of on-the-job 
training provided to the foreign crews. Lack of 
definitive guidances for on-the-job training costs may 
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create a problematic issue between the U.S. and the 
recipient Navy. Thus, research on this issue 
proposing a new pricing procedure is vital. 
Impacts of FMS/FML ships in the establishment of the 
defense industrial base for the recipient countries. 
Currently most of the recipient countries have limited 
defense industrial bases to sustain the FMS/FML ships. 
An in-depth research for the impacts of these ships on 
recipient country defense industrial base is required 
for sustaining the effective operation of the ships by 
the recipient navies. " 
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APPENDIX.  DETAILED SHIP TRANSFER PROCESS 
This appendix describes the basic transfer process 
necessary to successfully complete the turnover of a U.S. Navy 
ship to the customer navy. 
A.   THE PLANNING PHASE 
1.   Ship Availability 
The process leading to "U.S.Navy ships being made 
available for foreign transfer can often be forecast well in 
advance or sometimes be short fused as budget direction and 
other political influences cause immediate changes in Navy 
force structure. 
a. Ships Expected Service Lives (ESL) 
The Navy Programming Division (NPD) periodically 
provides a memo that states the policy for force level 
projections and reflects years of expected service for all 
ship classes for use by resource sponsors in long range 
planning. Ships will normally be retired upon reaching ESL. 
Extensions beyond ESL require resource sponsors to submit 
requests with justification and a statement that fiscal and 
manpower resources are available to support retention. 
b. Ship and Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables 
(SASDT) 
The value of this document is that it shows the 
fiscal year that a ship is scheduled to change. These changes 
are from: new construction to active, active to inactive, 
inactive to active, and from active/inactive to disposal. 
The Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) 
sponsor reviews this document coincident to the budget cycle. 
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As ship's near the end of their ESL, the sponsor initiates the 
retirement process. This includes: obtain recommendations 
from Fleet CINCs, obtain CNO retirement approval, obtain 
approval from Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), decide on 
disposition plans for each ship and budget inactivation 
funding. 
c.  Ship Disposition Review (SDR) 
In this process, OPNAV warfare sponsors confirm ship 
inactivation schedules, determines the ultimate disposition of 
retiring ships and confirms the status of those already in the 
Inactive Fleet (IF) . This is an annual meeting, the purpose 
of which is to review the retention status of mobilization 
assets presently in the IF, ship presently head for FMS/FML, 
and all ships scheduled for decommissioning/deactivation for 
the next seven fiscal years. It will determine which of these 
ships should remain or be scheduled for retention as 
mobilization assets, which should be made available for FMS or 
FML, and which should be disposed. The SDR develops a 
document for CNO approval [Ref. 14:p. 3]. 
2. Foreign Transfer Options and Prerequisites 
Prior to a vessel being offered for transfer certain 
decisions and administrative prerequisites must be met. The 
board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspections and the 
CNO certifications are required, time consuming events needed 
to permit the transfer process to proceed. 
a.  INSURV Inspections 
These are the periodic inspections of ships by the 
INSURV which are required by 10 U.S. Code, Article 7304. 
Further OPNAVINST 4770.5F requires that ships scheduled for 
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decommissioning be inspected by INSURV from 2-6 months before 
inactivation to document their material condition. The 
results of these inspections are critical to OPNAV decisions 
on the ultimate disposition of the vessels. Ships found "fit 
for further service" are normally retained for USN 
mobilization purposes or made available for foreign transfer 
under a lease agreement. Vessels found "unfit for further 
service" are normally struck from the Naval vessel register 
and made available for foreign sale or disposed of after 
useable systems and equipments are removed. 
b. CNO Certifications 
Another key event in the disposition process are the 
certifications required of the CNO. As delineated in 10 U.S. 
Code, Article 73 07 "Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no battleship, aircraft carrier, cruiser, destroyer, or 
submarine of the USN may be sold, transferred, or otherwise 
disposed of, unless the CNO certifies that it is not essential 
to the defense of the U.S." In addition, Chapter 6 of the 
AECA states "the president may not lease defense articles 
unless he determines they are not for the time needed for 
public use." This certification is also required of the CNO 
as a basis for a subsequent determination by the Director, 
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). 
c. SECNAV Authority to Strike/Sell/Lease 
By SECNAVINST 5440.4 of 17 December 1984, the SECNAV 
has stated that "no active or inactive ship of the USN may be 
decommissioned, deactivated, stricken, transferred to the 
custody of a  foreign government or any other USG agency, or 
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otherwise  stricken  or  transferred  without  the  direct 
authorization of the SECNAV." 
B.   THE SHIP OFFER PHASE 
1. Foreign Government Requests 
These requests can by in the form of formal written 
documents to any level in the USG or informal verbal exchanges 
that filter down to OPNAV/Navy IPO when a U.S. dignitary 
returns from a formal visit. The most formal document which 
may include a foreign countries requirement for a ship 
transfer is the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security 
Assistance (AIASA). This report is submitted annually by the 
U.S. Diplomatic Mission in the country requests for ships are 
channeled through the country SAO and back to the Navy 
directly. In addition there are occasions when countries are 
offered ships based a decision within the USG that it would be 
in USG interest to assist in the development of their Navy. 
This can be initiated by screening messages to the Fleet 
CINC's requesting a justified and prioritized assessment of 
country requirements for ships in their theater of operations. 
Offers of this nature are normally proposed in a general way 
to the foreign Navy through SA channels before any specific 
offer is initiated. 
2. Ship Transfer Offers Approval 
The document used to obtain approval of which countries 
will be offered specific ships is drafted and coordinated by 
OPNAV. It is a memorandum to SECNAV with an accompanying memo 
for SECNAV to sign out to the SECDEF. An enclosure lists the 
countries with the ships proposed for transfer and another 
enclosure provides supporting rationale on the countries 
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selected. This memo will also contain the certifications 
required of the CNO to transfer a combatant or to lease any 
vessel. Prior to CNO signature, this proposal is cleared in 
OPNAV/Navy IPO and informally coordinated with the staffs of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and DSAA. This is accom- 
plished to minimize changes after signature by CNO. Since 
this a politically sensitive decision document, the formal 
coordination at SECDEF is extensive and includes many staff 
directions as well as special groups such as: Excess Defense 
Articles allocation Committee, Low Intensity Conflict Group, 
DOD Drug Coordinator and'JCS. These are listed to show the 
political sensitivity of this program and indicates why it 
often takes months to gain the necessary approvals. 
3.   CNO to CNO Formal Ship Offer 
Upon approval by SECDEF to extend offers, OPNAV in 
coordination with the Navy IPO will draft a letter to the 
foreign country CNO (or equivalent). The letter will be 
signed by CNO and forwarded through Security Assistance 
channels to ensure the U.S. Ambassador and Defense Attache are 
in concurrence. This offer to undertake the ship offer 
includes several points: 
• Identifies the specific ships offered. 
• States the transfer is subject to congressional 
approval. 
• States Navy IPO will contact their government 
representative to provide background information, 
set up a ship inspection visit, host a conference 
to discuss transfer details and discuss costs. 
Ill 
. i  il s t h ficatio
e e h  o ra  bat t e
s l.  g t r , s l
V/ a P nfor al i h
h i f t JC . i o -
sh i i i g .
 li i v i o ent, l
r i t  ~ n u a
io ell i l : ces ef
rti lo io mittee, i onfli t r p,
r oordi at r 'J . iste o
lit l sit a i t
ont r vals.
. . al i ff
p r al ff rs,
r i t it a P ill r ft
t i alent).  ill  
g o ecurit  ssi
nel r . . ba sador ef s  tt  
curr ce. hi  f r dert   i  f r 
 eral i ts: 
ntifi   ecifi  i  f r . 
t t   r  j t  gressi al 
roval. 
t t  av   ill ntact ir er ent 
r tat   r i  r  ati n, 
t  i  t  isit, ost f r  
 i s  f r etail   i ss sts. 
111 
4. Navy IPO Letter to Inspect Ships and Receive 
Transfer Briefing 
After the CNO offers are forwarded to the foreign 
government, Navy IPO works with NAVSEASYSCOM, INACTSHIPSOM, 
NAVSUPSYSCOM,  NETSAFA,  and  appropriate  systems  command 
organizations  to  develop  a  schedule  that  will  allow 
inspections of ships and follow up formal technical briefings 
in an orderly fashion over the next 6-8 months.  This is often 
difficult as most countries want to start immediately. 
However, preparations for visits/briefings require time and 
coordination, and must consider the schedules and limited 
assets of all participants.  Prior to sending the invitation 
to the foreign government, Navy IPO informally discusses a 
proposed schedule with the SAO and/or the local foreign 
Embassy.  The Letter of Invitation from Navy IPO generally 
contains the following: 
• Identifies ships offered. 
• Provides current location of ships. 
• Proposes dates for foreign team to inspect ships. 
• Proposes dates for formal briefings to outline 
legal/administrative requirements and costs associ- 
ated with the transfer. 
• Advises that this invitation does not constitute a 
formal agreement to transfer the ships. 
C.   SHIP INSPECTIONS AND FORMAL BRIEFINGS PHASE 
After acceptance of the visit/briefing offer by the 
foreign government, Navy IPO sends a message to the various 
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activities that will be implementing or supporting the 
transfer program. It will outline the inspection/formal 
briefing schedule, provide a rough agenda, and solicit ideas/ 
suggestions from the supporting activities. The message will 
request points of contact within each organization to 
facilitate visit/briefing arrangements and any schedule 
adjustments that may become necessary. Additional informa- 
tion, as it is known, is included to help with planning. 
1. Ship Inspections 
The inspections are normally held at fleet locations, 
Navy Inactive ship Maintenance Facilities, or Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) facilities. Each of these activities 
need to be prebriefed on the transfer process, necessary for 
a detailed inspection and any unique protocol appropriate to 
the rank or level of the foreign inspectors. On some 
occasions they have requested to visit other activities that 
might be used to support the transfer (training, logistics, 
repair facilities, etc.). 
2. Formal Briefings at Navy IPO/NAVSEASYSCOM 
Within a day or two following the ship inspections, 
formal transfer briefings will be held at Navy IPO/ 
NAVSEASYSCOM. These briefings will outline in detail the 
transfer process, a general transfer plan, technical details 
on the key systems and equipment on the ships, available 
training and follow-on support. A desirable result of the 
discussions is to find out what the foreign country desires in 
terms of training, logistics, and pre/post transfer repairs or 
upgrades.  Information gathered during these exchanges will be 
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important in the development of lease/sale agreements the 
transfer plan and LOA's used to provide services/support. 
3.   Formal Country Commitment 
The final action in this preliminary step in the transfer 
process is the most important. Navy IPO will solicit a formal 
commitment from the foreign government that they are 
interested in pursuing the ship transfer. Normally, the 
country response is in the form of a LOR. Having seen the 
ships and been presented with the facts and costs associated 
with the sale or lease, each foreign government must decide if 
they have the assets necessary to succeed. Their in-country 
facilities, number and quantity of personnel, and available 
budget authority may fall short of the significant infra- 
structure required to support additionally ships. 
From the USN perspective this official assurance is 
important before imitating the congressional notification/ 
legislation necessary to authorized the transfer. It is USN 
policy to avoid the time consuming and politically sensitive 
step of proposing legislation before Congress if they are not 
sure the country wants to proceed. 
D.   CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND SALE/LEASE DEVELOPMENT 
PHASE 
Upon completion of the above preliminary phases of the 
ship transfer  process the actual implementation of the 
transfer is set in motion by the Navy IPO.  This includes 
formally assigning an Implementation Agent, initiating the 
Congressional approval process, and developing the transfer 
many LOA's needed to support the transfer. 
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1. The Implementing Directive 
Although the assignment of the Implementing Agent is 
generally clear prior to the formal ship transfer briefings, 
the official assignment normally comes after the foreign 
government confirms their commitment to continue the transfer. 
Navy IPO announces the assignment to the many Navy activities 
involved in the transfer by message, with a general outline of 
the transfer timetable. The announcement tasks and calls an 
supporting activities to provide points of contact during the 
formal transfer briefings/discussions establishes the basis 
for the plan submitted by'the Implementing Agent. 
2. Congressional Notification/Legislation 
Title 10, U.S. Code, Article 7307 imposes the congres- 
sional requirements. They are also outlined in Chapter 2 of 
the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). 
a.   Article 7307 (b)(1) 
According to this article, a Naval vessel that is in 
excess of 3000 light tons or less than 20 years of age may not 
be transferred to another nation, unless approved by law and 
enacted by Congress. In order to imitate the actions for 
Congressional Legislation, Navy IPO submits a memorandum to 
the Office of Legislative Affairs of Navy (OLA) which encloses 
the proposed bill and ship data/characteristics. Simul- 
taneously, a copy of this memorandum is provided to the 
DSAA/OPS for coordination. OLA proposes the bill for 
Congressional Enactment as it is stated in SECNAVINST 5730.56 
and obtains required clearances from SECNAV and SECDEF, Office 
of Management and Budget before proposing it to Congress. 
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Congressional clearance starts with committee actions under- 
taken by: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, House 
Armed Services Committee, and other committees with oversight 
interest. When all of these political hearings are completed, 
the proposed bill is voted on by the House and Senate. 
Finally, with the signature of the President, enacting 
legislation is completed. 
b.   Article 7307(b)(2) 
Under this article, a Naval vessel that is less than 
3000 light tons and greater than 20 years old may be 
transferred only after the SECNAV has notified Congress in 
writing of the proposal transfer and 3 0 days of continuous 
session of Congress have expired without legislation objecting 
to the proposed transfers. In order to initiate the action 
for Congressional Notification, Navy IPO submits a memorandum 
to OLA which requests a Congressional Notification and 
provides ship/data characteristics. As like in the legis- 
lation case, a copy of this memorandum is provided to the 
DSAA/OPS for coordination. Based on this memo OLA drafts a 
Notification Letter to Congressional Committees and simul- 
taneously obtains required clearances within USN organiza- 
tions. When 30 days continuous session of Congress concludes 
without legislation objecting to the proposed transfer, ship 
transfers are automatically authorized. 
3.   Lease Development 
Upon completion of Congressional notification/legislation 
requirements, the proposed lease and a determination drafted 
by Navy IPO are forwarded to DSAA for final approval. 
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Subsequent to DSAA approval, the actual lease agreement is 
signed by the appropriate representatives of both countries. 
A lease designation is used to track the lease in existing 
automated systems. Schedule A of each lease identifies the 
replacement costs of the ships being leased and the schedule 
for rental payment due to the USG. Billing to the lessee will 
be based on this schedule of payments and will be included on 
a separate form with the country's quarterly FMS billing 
statement. These payments by the customer country must come 
from national funds and cannot be paid with FMS credits. 
4.   Sale LOA Development 
An LOA is used for FMS cases to execute the sale. If the 
LOA is acceptable to the purchaser, they have sixty days to 
complete, sign, and forward it with any required initial 
payment. The LOA becomes a contract when it is accepted an 
signed by a representative of the purchasing nation. Once 
signed, the LOA is assigned a case number, and it is referred 
to as an FMS case by this case number. The sale price of 
ships is developed in accordance with procedures outlined in 
DODINST 7250.3M and SAMM Chapter 7. Normally, the sale price 
is the greater of the current market value, fair value or 
scrap value of the ship. In addition, the value of onboard 
repair parts, fuel and lube oil, and small arms ammunition is 
added where applicable. 
D.   TRANSFER IMPLEMENTATION AND SUBSEQUENT SUPPORT PHASE 
Subsequent to establishment of transfer or method through 
bilateral agreement between the countries actual transfer of 
the ships are executed according to the general provisions 
defined below: 
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1.   Delivery Preparations 
The conditions under which the transfer is carried out 
are detailed in the Transfer Plan and LOA/Lease agreement. 
SECNAVINST 4900.48 provides guidance on the release and 
removal of the classified equipment communication secure 
equipment, tactical publications on-board of the ships. 
Generally, the ships records and correspondence are not 
removed prior to a hot ship transfer. Machinery and equipment 
history records, Planned Maintenance System (PMS), COSAL/ 
COSMAL and the Current Ship's Maintenance Project (CSMP) are 
transferred to the recipient country. 
Normally, USN will order consumables, repair parts, COSAL 
deficiencies, and material required by the recipient country. 
These items may be ordered by open purchase with the country 
to reimburse costs from a FMS case, or from the Navy Supply 
System by directly charging to the FMS case. 
Gun ammunition (except for small arms ammunition and 
pyrotechnics), missiles, and torpedoes are not transferred 
with the ship. These items, if authorized for release and 
transfer to the foreign government, may be separately 
purchased by the foreign Navy under FMS cases [Ref. 13]. 
b.   Foreign Crew Support 
The Implementing Agency is responsible for arranging 
the support for the foreign crew members upon their arrival at 
the transfer site. This entails arranging for messing, 
berthing, transportation, and training coordination, providing 
office space and general support during the transfer. The 
foreign crew members taking the custody of the ship at 
transfer arrive at the ship through several channels.  Some 
118 
. eli arati
dit er hi t
t i r sf r l A/Leas ent.
I . i i
oval ent municati
i ent, t l Ublicat i s.
enera l , espo t
e r  t ranE:jfer. achiner ent
i r s, l aint e P  , S L/
urr t i ' aint r j t C P)
ra t ntr .
or a ly, ill r ables, i rts,
fi ci s, ateri l i t ntr .
es tem a r it t
im r st rom  , rom a l
e i t .
uniti t all uniti
r t hnics), issil s, p t ra
it i . es te s, t r
r ent, a r t
g a er ef. ].
. r i ort
pl enti ge si l a
ort g e e bers i l t
. hi t il a essi g,
rt i , ra rt t , ain n r i ati , i
eral ort r f r.
g e e bers t
t o r l nels.
may have been in the U.S. attending various USN and DOD formal 
school under the sponsorship of Naval Education and Training 
SA Field Activity (NETSAFA) or the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) Program. Still others may be 
arriving directly from the country. 
c.   Training Support 
Training is handled under a separate FMS case from 
the ship transfer. Prior to ship transfer, a ship transfer 
training plan is developed by NETSAFA. The plan addresses the 
concepts an manpower, Personnel and Training (MP&T) 
requirements involved in the transfer, and the maintenance and 
manning concepts for the ship's operation subsequent to the 
transfer. Training is authorized by Navy IPO and NETSAFA. 
The Implementing Agency (IA) is the training coordinator for 
the foreign crew. As such the IA will arrange for and 
establish liaison with appropriate training commands on behalf 
of the foreign crew. Training under the IMET Program, 
regardless of the method of transfer or the legal authority, 
is paid for by FMS credits. 
Specific  issues  associated  with  training  are 
discussed below. 
(1) Formal School Training. Formal School Training 
is coordinated by NETSAFA and conducted as English Language 
training, Basic Skills Training and Specific Equipment 
Training at a designated USN training facility. 
(2) On-the-Job-Training (OJT). On-the-Job-Training 
is training in a task or duty while engaged in its performance 
during daily operation and maintenance situations. It can be 
performed either as a formal, scheduled program or informally 
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through the initiative of the trainer/trainee. In the ship 
transfer process, OJT is done extensively in Fleet Introduc- 
tion Training and particularly during underway training 
evaluations. It is critical to foreign Navy personnel 
participating in the transfer to ensure a "safe-to sail" and 
"combat-ready" shipboard environment. Under this concept, 
while each crew member will have received training in basic 
operations and maintenance of individual systems and equip- 
ment, additional on-board training in watch station qualifica- 
tion is conducted to ensure the crew is effectively trained in 
standard operating procedures, emergency and casualty drills. 
On-the-job-training is conducted with the provision of Fleet 
Training Group (FTG), Mobile Training Team (MTT) and contrac- 
tor provided training support [Ref. 15]. 
d. Security 
The IA is responsible for ensuring adequate ship 
security is provided until the transfer. Arrangement are made 
with the host facility (Naval base, shipyard, etc.) and the 
decommissioning crew in conjunction with the foreign crew to 
handle ship and pier security. Ships forces handle the ships 
internal security until the transfer [Ref. 17] . 
e. Decommissioning and Transfer Ceremony 
The transfer ceremony is normally held concurrent 
with the USN decommissioning of the ship. The transfer 
ceremony is required in the case of a hot ship transfer, and 
may be conducted for other transfers, if it is requested by 
the foreign country, the IA represents the U.S. CNO at the 
transfer ceremony and the officer designated by the IA 
(usually the Squadron Commander or the Decommissioning Ship 
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Commanding Officer) is responsible for conducting the 
ceremony. That officer will be authorized to turn over the 
ship to the foreign government. The foreign country takes 
possession of the vessel at the conclusion of the USN 
decommissioning ceremony. 
f. Transfer Documentation 
A certificate of delivery is provided by Navy IPO 
for execution by the officer authorized to turn over the ship 
to the foreign Navy. The certification is signed in 
duplicate, by the IA and the representative of the foreign 
government during the transfer ceremony. 
g. Status of Ship 
The U.S.Navy maintains legal responsibility until 
the ship is decommissioned and both parties have signed either 
the Lease Agreement or Sale LOA and the Delivery Certificates. 
After a hot ship transfer, the ship proceeds under the flag 
and command of the foreign Navy commanding officer as a 
commissioned ship of the recipient Navy. If the ship is 
transferred from an inactive status, it becomes the legal 
responsibility of the recipient government after delivery. 
h. Homebound Logistics and Communications Support 
Logistics and communications support for the 
homebound voyage is authorized in SECNAVINST 4900.49. Such 
support will be provided under FMS and will be priced in 
accordance with the FMS Financial Management Manual (DOD 
7290.3M). Spare parts and consumables needed can be 
requisitioned through the USN supply system by the foreign 
crew on a "fill or kill" basis on cost-reimbursable basis 
after transfer.   This is not authorization for routine 
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replenishment of spares by the foreign country. Routine 
replenishment, whether for a short or long periods, based on 
the desires of the foreign country will be purchased under a 
separate FMS spares replenishment case. 
i.   Third Country Visit  Clearance 
In preparation for the transit home, the recipient 
navy may schedule port calls in Third World countries. In 
this case, it is the sole responsibility of the foreign 
government to obtain any diplomatic clearance which may be 
required by the Third World country government. The IA will 
assist the foreign Navy during this process by having the 
visit clearances checked by the U.S. Defense Attache Office in 
the countries to be visited, and verification of this 
clearance will be communicated to the CNO no later than two 
weeks prior to the ship's departure from U.S. waters. 
j.       Ship's Departure 
After completion of the transfer ceremony and 
signing of the delivery certificates, the recipient may take 
the ships to its homeport at the time decided by the country. 
k.        Post Delivery Support 
The responsible agent for continued support after 
the Hot/Cold ship transfer is completed is NAVSEASYSCOM. 
After the foreign country has taken possession of a leased 
vessel, NAVSEASYSCOM will be directed by Navy IPO to conduct 
periodic inspections of the vessel to ascertain its condition 
and continue as an mobilization asset for the U.S.Navy. 
Leased ships no longer fit for U.S. service, or those which 
are excess to USN requirements, may be struck from the Naval 
Vessel Register and sold.  The in-country SAO is responsible 
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for monitoring the appropriate use of the vessel. The SAO 
shall also make recommendation through Navy IPO concerning 
local support in training, logistics, communications, adminis- 
trative, and technical support required to maintain the ship. 
Post transfer support is provided only to the extent funded by 
the recipient country in a FMS support case. This may include 
NAVSEASYSCOM review of the foreign country maintenance and 
ship support facilities through a site survey. An initial 
survey is usually performed to support work planning for the 
ship prior to transfer. This is performed so that appropriate 
work will be accomplished at the foreign shipyards and allows 
the opportunity for the USN to offer follow-on technical 
support [Ref. 19] . 
D.   FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT 
Follow-on support consists of a wide range of available 
services. although normally focused on repair parts, it can 
also include industrial, technical, training, and documenta- 
tion services. The U.S.Navy support can usually be provided, 
if it is separately requested and funded by the foreign 
country. 
1.   Maintenance/Industrial Repair 
There are several actions the USN can take to assist the 
foreign country in defining or validating their maintenance 
concept. The primary action is to perform a maintenance 
history analysis to determine what type of maintenance is to 
be expected to be accomplished by the foreign country. 
This analysis can include previous corrective maintenance 
actions, planned preventive maintenance, and planned class 
maintenance.  This will allow for the projection of required 
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manpower and skill levels at both the ship level and 
industrial (shipyard) level. A second action involves a 
training survey at the host's country training capability that 
provides information or the skill levels of their existing 
sailors and shipyard workers. This will also assist the USN 
in making recommendations for additional training required in 
order to support the operation and maintenance of the ship. 
A third action, an industrial repair facility (shipyard) site 
survey, will provide an insight as to the host country's 
capability to perform the maintenance actions defined by the 
maintenance history analysis. Utilizing the actions defined 
above, the USN can provide assistance to the host country in 
determining additional crew training and industrial repair 
requirements, including equipment procurement, documentation, 
training and manning that will be required to properly perform 
maintenance on their newly acquired ships. 
2.   Supply Support 
Supply support is the identification, procurement, and 
inventory control of shipboard allowance material and shore 
based initial supply support material required to support ship 
operations and maintenance. This includes the provision of 
support services for any shipboard and in-country supply 
infra-structure which will manage provided material. Coordin- 
ated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) establishes the range 
and depth of repair parts, special tools, and portable equip- 
ment required to operate and maintain installed equipment, and 
is designed to give the ship a self-supporting capability for 
90 days. A primary goal of the transfer process is to ensure 
that the ship's COSAL and repair parts are updated to support 
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the actual on-board equipment when the transfer is completed. 
The Coordinated Shore Based Material Allowance List (COSMAL) 
reflects the repair part allowance, usually two years support, 
for a group of ships or an entire Navy. The COSMAL serves the 
same purpose for foreign Navies as does the DOD supply system 
for the USN ships. The COSMAL identifies the foreign 
customer's supply system stock to re-supply their ships as 
well as to support intermediate.and depot level maintenance, 
and combines it into a single document. The establishment of 
a formalized system to update weapon system file (WSF) and its 
associated products (COSAL, COSMAL, etc.) is critical for 
providing long term accurate logistics and technical support 
to transferred ships. Using the newly computed fleet COSMAL 
allowance, a match to existing in-country assets should be 
made by the customer country to identify the residual defici- 
encies that need to be reviewed for procurement action. A 
system, such as Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC)'s automated 
Monthly COSAL maintenance action report program is indispens- 
able in this area. The development of COSAL and COSMAL 
procurement of communicating spare parts as required is 
coordinated by NAVSEASYSCOM and is funded by the foreign 
government. 
3.   Training Support 
Training includes familiarization (indoctrination) train- 
ing, individual and team training, initial (factory/contrac- 
tor) training, replacement (personal) training, formal (class- 
room) training, OJT, and follow-on training. Most training is 
provided prior to ship transfer. However, because of the 
depth and breath of knowledge required after ship transfer, 
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follow-on training is recommended and scheduled as required by 
the foreign country. A comprehensive training plan for both 
shipboard and shipyard training is developed. The plan 
identifies equipments/systems and training required to qualify 
shipyard personnel to perform advanced level mainten-ance. 
Personnel from the USG activities capable of providing the 
required shipboard/shipyard training are utilized for specific 
training periods. After fo.llow-on training has been 
completed, the foreign country should have the capability of 
training the number of personnel to fulfill their mission. 
4.   Technical Documentation Update 
The documentation which is provided under the ship 
transfer program includes a wide variety of material. The 
majority of documentation used in primary support of the ship 
is directly related to the operation and maintenance of its 
systems and equipment. For ship transfers, publication costs 
are included in the price of the ship. If additional 
publications are ordered from the Aviation Supply Officer 
(ASO), the foreign customer will pay the actual cost of the 
publication. The actual cost is the cost the government paid 
to the Navy activity or vendor for the technical manual which 
includes development costs [Ref. 18:p. 7] . Naval Sea System 
Command is responsible to develop a process for providing 
Technical Manual Follow-on Support. Although a CD-ROM system 
may be available eventually for SA customers, a process for 
providing hard copy updates and changes to the Technical 
Manuals on-board the ship transferred is required. In order 
to develop a system for providing updates to Technical Manuals 
for several programs, NAVSEASYSCOM identifies a set of factors 
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which are common to multiple programs and items which can be 
easily tracked and made compatible with the USN Technical 
Manual System. Also, economy is a very large factor in this 
analysis. The common factor in all programs is the list of 
documentation held. Many older U.S. ships do not have an 
accurate COSAL/Ship Configuration and Logistics Support 
Information System (SCLSIS) baseline from which to start, and 
even for those which do an automatic distribution based only 
on SCLSIS data presents additional difficulties concerning 
payment for documentation provided, shipping addresses, 
correct quantities being delivered, and releasibility 
questions. 
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